Case No. EWFC-50

[2021] EWHC 154 (Fam) at [19] – [26]:“19. There are a very large number of cases where the courts have addressed the question of in what circumstances an applicant should be granted parental responsibility for a child when they do not have that status automatically. Many of these are referred to in the very helpful judgment of Black LJ (as she then was) in Re G (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 336 .20. The starting point is as set out in Re H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental Rights (No 3) [1991] Fam 151 where the Court of Appeal highlighted three particular features from amongst the factors the court should take into account when considering an application by a father for parental responsibility. These were the degree of commitment the father had shown to the child; the degree of attachment between them; and the motivation behind the father's application. In my view, these are the three touchstone issues that the court has to address when deciding parental responsibility, and there is no difference in this regard between a father and a woman who argues she stands in the position of a second female parent.21. A number of judges have emphasised the status that parental responsibility confers, see as but one example, Ryder LJ in Re M (Parental Responsibility Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 969 :"27. I return now to the question of status. The status conferred by parental responsibility is an important legal recognition of the delicate balance between rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority that are the components of family and private life. It is integral to the concept of parental responsibility. It is not, however, a separate 'stand alone' factor, let alone a presumptive factor to be weighed alongside other Re S factors in the welfare consideration of whether a parental responsibility order should be made. The status of parental responsibility underlies the authorities and the guidance that was applied by the judge in this case. It would no doubt have been helpful to articulate the importance of parental responsibility as a status question i.e. the reason why the Re S factors have been identified as being relevant to the welfare question, but that would not have altered the evidence the judge accepted nor the evaluative judgment on the Re S factors to which he came. For my part, I have come to the clear conclusion that the judge did not err in law nor was there any error in his approach or his evaluation."22. In