Case Nos: IP-2023-000039 and IP-2023-000132 - [2024] EWHC 2889 (IPEC)
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court

Case Nos: IP-2023-000039 and IP-2023-000132 - [2024] EWHC 2889 (IPEC)

Fecha: 15-Nov-2024

The law

The law

Summary judgment / strike out

23.

The main principles of law on the summary disposal of a claim or one or more issues within a claim are well established and are set out in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), at [15] (approved in AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098, at [24]). Although stated in terms appropriate to an application to strike out, they apply to an application for summary judgment (see Price v Flitcraft Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 850, at [40]). This is the relevant passage from Easyair:

‘The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows:

i)

The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91;

ii)

A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8];

iii)

In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman;

iv)

This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]

v)

However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;

vi)

Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton PharmaceuticalCo 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63;

vii)

On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.’

24.

The overlap between an application to strike out all or part of a statement of case under CPR 3.4 and an application for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 is not complete. An issue arose in the present applications with regard to notification required in an Application Notice and in supporting evidence.

25.

Applications to strike out may go ahead based solely on the pleadings, but if facts need to be proved evidence can and should be filed and served, see PD 3A para. 5.2. The difference is that the procedural requirements which govern evidence filed and served under Part 24 do not apply under CPR 3.4. Those requirements are contained in rule 24.5 and are, so far as is relevant:

(1) The application notice must —

(a)

state that the application is for summary judgment;

(b)

identify concisely any point of law or document relied upon;

(3)

If a party wishes to rely on written evidence at the hearing, other than in a claim under rule 24.4(3), they must file and serve copies of such evidence on every other party at least —

(a)

7 days before the hearing in the case of a respondent’s evidence, or evidence of any party where the hearing is fixed by the court of its own initiative;

(b)

3 days before the hearing in the case of an applicant’s evidence in reply, or reply evidence of any party where the hearing is fixed by the court of its own initiative.

26.

The provision in rule 24.5(1)(b) was until recently found in paragraph 2 of the practice direction supplementing Part 24. It and the provision in CPR 24.5(3) – formerly to be found in CPR 24.5(1) – were considered by the Court of Appeal in Price v Flitcraft Ltd [2020] EWCA (Civ) 850. Floyd LJ, with whom David Richards and Patten LJJ agreed, quoted paragraph 2 of the practice direction and continued:

‘[43] Rule 24.5(1) requires a respondent who wishes to rely on written evidence at the hearing, to file that written evidence and serve copies on every other party to the application at least 7 days before the summary judgment hearing. Thus in an idealised case, a claimant can issue and serve an application for summary judgment to be heard in 14 days’ time. The defendant must serve his evidence 7 days before the hearing, and the claimant must serve any evidence in reply at least 3 days before the hearing. If all this is done, the hearing can go ahead on the appointed day. The overall object of the rules and practice direction taken together is to ensure a fair hearing of the summary judgment application within a short time scale. The procedural safeguards, such as requiring notice of the rule under which the application is brought, identification of issues and/or a statement in the application notice or the evidence referred to in it that the applicant believes that the respondent has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue are important protections aimed at ensuring that the overall procedure is fair.’

27.

Often a party will apply both to strike out and for summary judgment without making any real distinction between the two alternatives. In my view, in such a case, if a party wishes to serve evidence solely in support of their application to strike out, with the result that the evidence is not subject to the procedural safeguards of Part 24.5, the applicant’s intention to limit the purpose of the evidence in that way should be clearly stated at the time of service so that the respondent knows where they stand.

28.

In the present instance the I-Smart Companies identified no distinction in the purpose of their evidence filed in support of their applications. The procedural safeguards of CPR 24.5 apply.