[2025] EWHC 1955 (KB)

The Judge was wrong to dismiss the argument that an unincorporated organisation cannot claim adverse possession.

This is particularised at paragraph 10 of the Written Submissions. The substance of the point is an alleged error of law. Paragraph 10 also includes what is also a pleading and/or evidential point.

As to the point of law, the Applicant relies upon Openshaw. In this decision, the FTT held as follows:

“I accept the legal force of everything Mr Weekes says about the issue of standing. There is no trust in the legal sense and the shifting membership body of the Club as a whole is not capable of having been in single exclusive possession of the Disputed Land for a period of 10 years. The latter point is true because paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act requires the person bringing the application himself to have been in adverse possession for the previous 10 years, thereby abolishing the doctrine of successive squatters under the old regime with the exception of the circumstances set out in paragraph 11 of Schedule 6. Paragraph 11 of Schedule 6 provides for two circumstances, neither of which apply in this case: the first is where the successive squatters are successors in title to each other and the second is where the squatter has been dispossessed and has then regained possession.

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Even if it is possible for all the members to claim adverse possession, all the members would need to be applicants since there is no legal entity which can represent their combined interest.”

The Judge was not arguably wrong in distinguishing this decision on the basis that it applies to the statutory regime governing adverse possession post 2002, in contrast to the claim for adverse possession relied upon by the Club which significantly pre-dated the Land Registration 2002 Act. As the FTT noted, one effect of the new Act was to abolish the prior doctrine of successive squatters under the old regime. The Judge was also entitled to distinguish the case, as he did, on the basis that in Openshaw the FTT accepted the submission that the applicants were not actually trustees of the relevant club. By contrast, and contrary to the pleading/evidential point raised by Mr Askan’s written submissions, there was both witness and evidentiary evidence before the Judge that, following the amendment to the pleading at the start of the trial to which no objection was taken, the Respondents were indeed the Trustees of the Club. For example, the 2004 TR1 states that “The Transferees are to hold the Property as bare trustees of The St Asaph Conservative Club”. There was, therefore, no error of law in distinguishing Openshaw on the basis that the Part 20 declaration was sought by trustees of the unincorporated association.