The Judge was wrong to find, as he did, the ownership of the contested land
The Judge was wrong to find, as he did, the ownership of the contested land.
These are taken together as they are interconnected. These overlapping points align broadly with the points made at paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 17, 21 and 23 of the Written Submissions.
The first of these complaints appears to assume, wrongly, that the Judge determined the outcome of the question of legal registration by reference to the Plan. It is plain from the judgment that it is not remotely arguable that this is what the Judge did. He referred, as I have done above, to the different coloured parcels of land by reference to the illustrative document provided as part of the Defence in order to frame the issues in dispute. That part of the Contested Land was unregistered (yellow and purple) and part registered (red) accords with the information provided by the title documentation for the land registered to the Applicant and the Respondent. The Plan was not ‘inadmissible evidence’; indeed, the Plan was not evidence at all, and was not arguably treated as such.
The Judge’s substantive determination of title to the land coloured red was made as a result of an analysis of the underlying documents, and in particular the 1908 and 1919 conveyance plans and the conveyances since, which the Judge could trace through, by specific reference to the 216 square yard plot, through to the pre-registration conveyance in 1997. The 2004 registration, predating the Bank’s first registration, refers back expressly to the 1919 conveyance. It is not reasonably arguable that ‘independent’ and ‘hard’ evidence was ignored. The opposite is the case.
The starting point was that the Red Land was clearly excluded from the Applicant’s registered title, as shown above, but included on the Club’s. Mr Askan had to therefore dislodge the legitimacy of the Club’s 2004 registration.
The Judge traced the Club’s title back. He placed significant emphasis upon the continued and consistent description of the size of the relevant plot, which can be seen plainly on the 1919 plan, through the conveyances to 2004 to demonstrate, with care, that his conclusion as to title was consistent with, not in contravention of, the information provided by the Land Registry, and all the documents demonstrating a line of consistent conveyance over the previous 80 years. There is no arguable, let alone rational, basis upon which to allege that the 2004 registration was procured by fraud with the connivance of corrupt Land Registry officials. Mr Askan, in oral submissions before me, effectively refused to engage with the consistency between the 2004 plan and the original 1919 conveyance (and the line of conveyances in between), or the continued reference to the (same) 216 square yard plot as shown on the 1919 plan in the documents throughout that time. Instead, he fixated on the difference between the 2004 plan and a 1997 planning permission document which the Judge dealt with at [62] of his judgment. Mr Askan’s submissions simply ignored all the evidence that points – very strongly – against the conclusion he has unfortunately, and without robust analysis, come to convince himself of. It is not reasonably arguable that the Judge was not entitled to prefer the consistent and decades-long conveyancing documentary record over 80 years as more reliable than a single document submitted for the purposes of planning permission in 1997.
As part of his analysis, the Judge properly dealt with Mr Askan’s argument that the 2004 registration was not or could not have been a first registration, given that a TR1 form was used rather than an FR1 form. The Judge’s conclusion on this issue was rational and certainly within the range of reasonable decisions a judge would come to on an objective review of the evidence. There was no case that the use of the wrong form itself, as a matter of law, invalidated the registration. Of particular significance was the fact that the TR1 form did not include any title number for the plot in Box 2, plainly indicating that the land had not previously been registered.

The Judge was also entitled to rely upon the fact that the Land Registry then provided a ‘Completion of Registration’ letter. I also note, in the unsolicited documentation provided to the Court following the oral submission that the Land Registry email of October 2023, the Land Registry stated:
“[F]irst registration of the registered title CYM191971 was completed in August 2004. The Deed which induced registration was a Transfer dated 12th July 2004, made between Jean Audrey Mary Walton and David Gwyn Williams (the Transferors) and David Gwyn Williams, Ronald Safhill and Graham John David Hardy. This transfers the land comprised in the Conveyances dated 24th February 1968 and 13th October 1919. I have attached a copy of the Transfer for your information.
Whilst HM Land Registry did not retain the entire Conveyances, it appears we did retain copies of the plans attached thereto. I have attached official copies of both plans to the Conveyances, along with an official copy of the title plan for CYM191971 for your information.
You will note that the part of the land edged with blue and green (within the area edged pink) on your plan, which is included in the registered title of CYM191971, is included within the area edged with red on the plan to the Conveyance dated 13th October 1919.
The title plan for CYM191971 was completed correctly, in accordance with the documentary title provided upon first registration.”
The accords with both the Judge’s and my analysis of the relevant documentation, the substance of with which, as I have stated, Mr Askan does not actually engage.
In the context of the TR1/FR1 issue, the Written Submissions suggest at paragraph 7 that the Club’s counsel lied, was in contempt of Court and that the Court intentionally ignored this misconduct. There is absolutely no basis for this serious allegation, and it illustrates the carefree attitude of Mr Askan when advancing such claims (with which his submissions are peppered). The passage of the transcript on which Mr Askan relies relates to an exchange relating to whether the 2004 registration took place by way of TR1 (it did) rather than FR1 (it did not), but whether it nevertheless in substance was a first registration, as Counsel for the Club had submitted (and as it was found to be). In no part of the transcript did the Court, as alleged by Mr Askan, ‘[accept] that the Respondent’s submissions of 16 December 20[2]4 were incorrect, deliberately false. Court was wrong to ignore the Respondent’s false statements by asking Appellant, ‘What are you wanting me to do’. In asking the latter question, the Judge was merely – and entirely properly - pointing out (during cross-examination) that the FR1/TR1 issue would be a matter for Mr Askan in submission. Far from accepting that the Club’s submissions were ‘deliberately false’, he accepted, entirely as it was open for him to do on the evidence (and consistent with the Land Registry’s own analysis), that in 2004 there was, in substance, a first registration of the Club’s title.
The third area of complaint, going to the substance of the legitimacy of the 2004 registration, is the manner in which the Judge rejected as irrelevant the existence with the Club’s disclosure of a document marked ‘For Internal Use Only’ by the Land Registry. Mr Askan submitted (at paragraph 7 of his Written Submissions), ‘Respondent created a new 2004 plan first appeared marker ‘Internal use only’ suggesting it was not previously publicly available, but denied a 1997 plan existed, contrary to DL entries….The 2004 plan was marked ‘Internal Use Only.’ The Court failed to query how the Respondent obtained a new title map from an independent government organisation. There was a total lack of interest in the Respondents’ questionable acts.’ At paragraph 21, Mr Askan extended the allegation relating to the possession of an ‘Internal Use Only’ land registry plan to infer wrongdoing on the part of the Club’s solicitors and/or someone within the Land Registry.
A review of the trial bundle demonstrates, contrary to Mr Askan’s determination to see a conspiracy against him, that the Land Registry sends out documents marked ‘Internal Use Only’ when seeking comments from interested parties. They are not secret documents which would only be accessible with the connivance of corrupt land registry officials. So, there is a letter from the Land Registry to the Club dated May 2024 relating to an update of the Club’s title plan based upon latest OS information. The plans provided for comment are marked ‘Internal Use Only’. Crucially, the trial bundle also includes a similar letter to Mr Askan in respect of his own property, enclosing two plans also marked, ‘Internal Use Only’. In other words, Mr Askan himself is in possession of Land Registry plans of his own property which are marked ‘Internal Use Only’. There is plainly nothing odd about such plans being in circulation: they are effectively drafts of documents prior to formal adoption, and the words are plainly a form of version-control. To rely upon the Club’s possession of a document marked in such a way to advance serious allegations of wrongdoing both against the Club and inferentially the Land Registry illustrates the extent to which Mr Askan has, regrettably, lost all sense of perspective and objectivity.
Mr Askan also referred to Ordnance Survey information and Google Earth information. I consider the Ordnance Survey information in the context of the timing of the building of the Wall, further below. The blurry Google Earth Pro image relied upon does not add materially to the debate, and does not dislodge the appropriate inference to be drawn from the conveyancing documents from 1919 onwards and the legitimacy of the 2004 registration.
The Judge was not only entitled to find as he did, but was upon my objective review of the same material, right to do so.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The Claim and Counterclaim
- The Judgment
- The Court’s Approach on Appeal
- Grounds Of Appeal
- The Judge was wrong to ignore the Respondent’s threats of physical violence and acts of aggression in the Courtroom towards the Appellant
- The Judge was wrong to find, as he did, the ownership of the contested land
- The Judge was wrong to dismiss the argument that an unincorporated organisation cannot claim adverse possession
- The Judge was wrong to find that there was a claim for adverse possession and in granting adverse possession
- The Judge was wrong to grant an easement under the lost modern act
- The Judge was wrong to ignore the direct testimony of the respondent’s witness statement
- The Judge was wrong to deny harassment and nuisance when the respondent first committed an offence
- Other Complaints
- Paragraphs 5 and 6
- Paragraph 22
- Paragraph 24
- The Additional Grounds of Appeal
- Other Applications
- Order that the Respondent complies with the discovery application file on 12 December 2024
- Conclusions
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