QB-2022-000174 - [2025] EWHC 1669 (KB)
Fecha: 02-Jul-2025
Contempt of court
Contempt of court
CPR 32.14 provides that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person who “makes or causes to be made” a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth.
It is not necessary at this stage to examine in detail the state of mind which is necessary for a finding of contempt. For present purposes we consider it at least arguable that a person who provides information knowing or intending that it will be used in a witness statement, knowing that the information is false or without an honest belief in its truth, is guilty of contempt of court: see e.g. R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin), [26].
We have already made reference to CPR 81.6. It provides as follows:
“If the court considers that a contempt of court (including a contempt in the face of the court) may have been committed, the court of its own initiative shall consider whether to proceed against the defendant in contempt proceedings.”
The application of CPR 81.6 involves a two-stage process. At the first stage, the court considers whether a contempt may have been committed. Once that threshold is met, the court must then reach an evaluative judgment whether contempt proceedings should be initiated: Ayinde, [28].
In view of the serious procedural deficiencies of the investigations, it is premature at this stage to form any view as to whether or not contempt proceedings are appropriate.
We note that, at paragraph 94 of his submissions, the Attorney General says this:
“If there is further action that the Court considers to be necessary, or further information that needs to be provided, then that will be done.”
We consider that further action is necessary. There should be a further, robust and independent investigation. It seems to us that the most appropriate forum for such an investigation would be IPCO. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner may, if he sees fit, nominate one or more of his judicial commissioners to carry out the task. The results of this investigation should then be provided to the court. We consider that all the materials that were made available to us should be provided to the individual or individuals conducting this new investigation.
- Heading
- Baroness Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill (Lady Chief Justice of England and Wales), Dame Victoria Sharp (President of the King’s Bench Division) and Mr Justice Chamberlain
- Legal context
- The importance of NCND
- What happened in this case
- Why it mattered whether MI5 had confirmed X’s CHIS status
- How the false evidence came to light
- MI5’s explanations and investigations
- Further OPEN disclosure
- Findings and conclusions Who was misled?
- The unrealistic maintenance of NCND
- The manner in which the court was informed about MI5’s investigations
- The adequacy of the investigations
- Contempt of court
- Corporate witness statements
- Conclusions