[2025] UKUT 166 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 166 (AAC)

Fecha: 26-Feb-2025

The ceasing to have effect argument

The ceasing to have effect argument

135.

Finally, the claimant sought to argue that, even if he made a “declaration of eligibility”, s.30 of the 2014 Act had ceased to have effect. I do not accept that argument, which involves a misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision. What s.30(13) of the 2014 Act provides is that

“This section ceases to have effect when the repeal of Part 1 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 made by Schedule 14 to the Welfare Reform Act 2012 has fully come into force”.

136.

It cannot properly be said that the repeal of the TCA 2002 has “fully come into force” when applicants (including the claimant until 19 March 2019) continue to receive tax credits where such credits are governed by Part 1 of the TCA 2002.

137.

Article 2 of the Commencement No.32 Order provides that

“The day appointed for the coming into force of section 33(1)(f) of the Act (abolition of tax credits) and the repeal of Part 1 of the 2002 Act (but not Schedule 1 or 3), by Part 1 of Schedule 14 to the Act, is 1st February 2019”

138.

That provision does not, however, prevent Part 1 of the TCA 2002 continuing to apply to the claimant (amongst many others) after 1 February 2019.

139.

The reason for that is that Article 3(1) of the Order contains savings which treat the provisions listed in Article 2 as not coming into force in certain cases:

Section 33(1)(f) of the Act, and the repeal of Part 1 of the 2002 Act (but not Schedule 1 or 3) by Part 1 of Schedule 14 to the Act, shall be treated as though they had not come into force, in relation to a case as referred to in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5) or (9).

140.

Article 3(2) provides that

“(2)

The case referred to is the case of an award of a tax credit that has effect for a period that includes 31st January 2019”.

141.

That was precisely the position in the present case: the tax credit award which terminated by operation of s.30 of the 2014 Act had been in place since 6 April 2018 and did not terminate until 19 March 2019.

142.

For the sake of completeness, I should add that I agree that the Tribunal made a slip in paragraph 29 of its statement of reasons when it said that no tax credits were payable to the claimant in respect of the relevant period, which would be the three months beginning on 20 May 2019. The relevant period is defined in s.13(4)-(5) and in this case would include the date of declaration on 14 March 2019 and not the three months beginning on 20 May 2019. Nevertheless, that slip could not affect the outcome of the appeal and should be regarded as immaterial.