[2025] UKUT 171 (AAC)

My analysis: Does a PMP exercise the judicial power of the state within the meaning and application of section 32 of FOIA?

In considering a PMP’s powers and functions, I start with the Police Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). Section 50 of that Act gives the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) the power to make regulations for police forces. Section 50(1) gives the power to make regulations as to the government, administration and conditions of service of police forces. Section 50(2) provides more specific regulation-making powers, including for making regulations with respect to the conduct, efficiency and effectiveness of members of police forces and the maintenance of discipline (section 50(2)(e)).

Section 50(3) of the 1996 Act requires regulations to be made establishing, or providing the establishment of, procedures for taking disciplinary proceedings in respect of the conduct, efficiency and effectiveness of members of police forces, including procedures for cases in which they may be dismissed.

The SSHD used section 50 of the 1996 Act to make the PCRs 2012 and the PCRs 2020 (including the amendments to the PCRs 2020 that came into effect on 07 May 2024).

Sections 87 and 87A of the 1996 Act give the SSHD and, with her approval, the College of Policing, the power to issue guidance as to the discharge of disciplinary functions (section 87) and about matters of conduct, efficiency and effectiveness (section 87A).

The power to issue guidance about disciplinary proceedings under section 87(1) allows the SSHD to issue guidance about discharge of their disciplinary functions to: (a) local policing bodies, (b) chief officers of police, (c) other members of police forces, (d) civilian police employees and (e) the Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The SSHD has used this power to issue statutory guidance called “Home Office Guidance Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing” (version 1, published 05 February 2020) and “Home Office Guidance Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures” (revised June 2018). I have read and taken both sets of guidance into account.

Paragraph 2.3 of the 2018 Guidance states that the misconduct procedures aim to provide a fair, open and proportionate method of dealing with alleged misconduct and that the procedures are intended to encourage a culture of learning and development for individuals and / or the organisation. Paragraph 2.4 refers to disciplinary action having a part, when circumstances require, but that improvement is always an integral dimension of any outcome. Paragraph 2.11 states that the misconduct procedures should not be used as a means of dealing with unsatisfactory performance and explains this should be dealt with using unsatisfactory performance procedures instead.

Paragraph 2.6 of the 2018 Guidance states:

“The police misconduct procedures are designed to reflect what is considered to be best practice in other fields of employment while recognising that police officers have a special status as holders of the Office of Constable. The police service is committed to ensuring that the procedure is applied fairly to everyone.”

Section 87(1B) allows the College of Policing to issue guidance to the persons mentioned in section 87(1)(a) to (c) about the discharge of their disciplinary functions in relation to members of police forces, special constables and former members. The College of Policing has issued guidance called: “Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings” (latest version 2023). I have read and taken into account this Guidance.

Paragraph 1.2 of the College of Policing (“CoP”) Guidance explains it is intended to assist persons appointed to conduct misconduct proceedings, including misconduct hearings, under Parts 4 and 5 of the PCRs 2020. Paragraph 2.3 of the Guidance states:

“The purpose of the police misconduct regime is threefold:

1.

To maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service

2.

To uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct

3.

To protect the public.”

Paragraph 2.4 explains these aims derive from specific authorities on the nature and purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings. The extracts from authorities listed at paragraph 2.4 of the CoP Guidance are the following:

Paragraph 2.7 of the CoP Guidance states misconduct proceedings are not designed to punish police officers and cites Laws LJ in Raschid v GMC [2007] 1 WLR 1460 at paragraph 18 (“The panel then is centrally concerned with the reputation or standing of the profession rather than the punishment of the doctor”). Paragraph 2.11 emphasises that misconduct proceedings (which includes misconduct meetings and misconduct hearings) must only be used to deal with misconduct that is so serious as to justify disciplinary proceedings. It includes a reminder that misconduct is defined as “a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action” (regulation 2 of the PCRs 2020).

Each of the PCRs 2012 and the PCRs 2020 operate by reference to whether an officer has committed misconduct or gross misconduct. Both are defined by reference to a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, with the difference between them being that gross misconduct is a breach so serious it justifies dismissal. The Standards of Professional Behaviour are set out in Schedule 2 to both sets of regulations.

Paragraphs 65 to 79 of Di Maria provide a useful and concise summary of the PCRs 2020 and the disciplinary regime in which they sit. The structure described is similar to the disciplinary regime under the PCRs 2012, which applied to the PMP about which Rabbi Kanter-Webber sought information. Differences in substance between the PCRs 2012 and the PCRs 2020 that are relevant when considering this appeal are:

Paragraphs 88 to 90 of Di Maria also provide a useful summary of the right to appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal (“PAT”) from a decision of a PMP. The officer concerned can appeal to the PAT but the appropriate authority (i.e., the police force) cannot and may only bring judicial review proceedings in respect of a PMP’s decision.

As explained in a Home Office Review called “The process of police officer dismissals” (“the Review”), published on 18 September 2023, police officers are office holders, rather than employees and do not have the ability to pursue unfair dismissal claims at the Employment Tribunal (apart from on unlawful discrimination grounds). Police officers instead have a statutory right of appeal to the PAT.

Paragraph 9(1) of Schedule 6 to the 1996 Act provides for all the costs and expenses of an appeal under section 85 of the Act to be paid from the police fund of the relevant local policing body. This includes the police force’s costs and any remuneration or expenses paid to the PAT members. Appellants are required to pay their own costs unless the PAT directs some or all of them are to be paid from the police fund of the relevant local policing body. The Review observes that there is no cost to the officer to appeal to the PAT although the officer may need to meet their own legal costs.

Paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the 1996 Act provides for the composition of a PAT, which consists of a legally qualified person, the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (or an Inspector of Constabulary nominated by that person) and the permanent secretary to the Home Office (or a Home Office director nominated by that person. The legally qualified person must satisfy the judicial appointment eligibility condition on a five-year basis and have been nominated by the Lord Chancellor (meaning they are on a list maintained by the Home Office).

As Mr Goss explained at the hearing on 13 February 2025, the rights of appeal to the PAT against a decision of a PMP are set out in rule 4 of the Police Appeals Tribunals Rules 2020. There is a right of appeal against a finding made by a PMP and also in respect of any decision to impose disciplinary action under the PCRs. PMP decisions must set out the right to appeal to a PAT (regulation 63 of PCRs 2020). The PAT is convened by a local policing body. An officer does not need to obtain permission to appeal to a PAT, although the PAT legally qualified chair is required to review the appeal documents and determine whether or not the appeal should be dismissed or proceed to a hearing. Hearings are held in public. A decision of the PAT is amenable, in principle, to judicial review.

As Mr Goss explained, there are defined categories of appeal grounds available to appeal to the PAT. The grounds of appeal in rule 4 are:

The Review reported that some Chief Constables raised concerns about the significant impact of officers not being dismissed by misconduct panels, where the Chief Constable believed that decision to be unreasonable and lenient (paragraph 6.2 of Review). The Review recommended amending the 1996 Act to provide a statutory right of appeal for Chief Constables to the PAT.

The Review confirms gives additional information about Mr Goss’s helpful explanation of what led to the PCRs 2020 being amended (from 07 May 2024). The Executive Summary of the Review explained the recommendation to have Chief Constables chair PMPs was responding to the system being unhelpfully imbalanced, leaving Chief Constables with insufficient responsibility over proceedings relating to their own workforce (page 6 of Review).

Paragraph 4.1 of the Review (page 51) emphasised the importance that any changes made to the (then) disciplinary system were rightly focused on improving public trust and confidence in policing. The Review explained that following events about high profile police officer abuses of power and breaches of public trust, some parts of the sector called for Chief Constables to have a greater say in deciding whether a police officer in their force should be dismissed or not. The Review stated that it is ultimately the Chief Constable as the corporation sole who is held to account for the standards and conduct of the officers operating under their direction and control, raising the question of how they can be held to account in this way, without being able to determine who they recruit and who they dismiss.

Paragraph 4.2 of the Review (page 53) explained that disciplinary arrangements differ amongst professional jurisdictions, but that the one key difference between policing and other professions is that LQCs, sitting as part of a PMP, are empowered to ultimately dismiss an officer. This is contrasted with other jurisdictions where panels operate to determine an individual’s “fitness to practise”. The Review explains this distinction as: “In effect, police misconduct panels make “employer” decisions, in a way that does not happen in other professional bodies.”.

Paragraph 4.3 of the Review (page 54) highlights some views were expressed that LQC decision-making was too lenient, although in a context where the outcome decisions were majority decisions by the PMP as a whole and therefore a LQC view was not determinative. The Review identified that evidence also showed LQCs had brought much needed levels of independence, transparency and legal fairness to the system, but that it was challenging for Chief Constables to be held (appropriately) to account on the culture and standards in their forces, when they did not have a leading role in proceedings deciding whether or not to retain an officer in their force (paragraph 4.8, page 60). The Review recommended that responsibility for chairing misconduct hearings be returned to Chief Constables (or their delegated senior officers), presenting this as striking a crucial balance of retaining independence while strengthening the role of Chief Constable.

There is also a useful summary of the development, over time, of the PCRs 2012 and their subsequent replacement by the PCRs 2020, in paragraphs 12 to 18 of the decision in Eckland (pages 909-10 of authorities bundle).

In my assessment, paragraphs 20, 30, 36 and 43 of Eckland are particularly relevant when identifying the powers and functions of a PMP. These include emphasis that misconduct proceedings against police officers are very unlike disciplinary proceedings by an ordinary employer and the clear purpose of the legislative scheme is that decisions about guilt and sanction should be taken out of the hands of the chief officer and be made by a process that is transparently independent (paragraph 20). Underhill LJ stated that PMPs were functionally wholly independent of the chief officer, even under the PCRs 2008 and the earliest version of the PCRs 2012 (before they were amended in 2015) with clear blue water between the chief officer and the panel (paragraph 30).

Set against this, however, Underhill LJ explained that even if the peculiarities of the police disciplinary system mean misconduct issues fall to be determined by an independent body exercising public functions, those functions nevertheless arise out of, and in the context of, the employment relationship (paragraph 36). He decided that the primary purpose of a PMP is to decide whether to take steps which will affect the relationship between a chief officer and a member of their force (whether by dismissal or imposing some lesser sanction). Underhill LJ assessed that the PMP is thus doing what would in ordinary circumstances be the responsibility of the chief officer as quasi-employer, reflected in the fact that the chief officer appoints the panel (paragraph 43). Underhill LJ explained it was unsurprising for the relationship of a chief officer and a PMP to be treated as analogous to that of common law principals / employers and their agents / employees, notwithstanding the PMP’s functional independence.

I also consider the analysis at paragraphs 78 of 81 of Wheeler to be relevant and helpful. Mr Justice Julian Knowles (“Knowles J.”) emphasised the role of a PMP as a statutory panel in adversarial proceedings between the appropriate authority (i.e. Chief Constable) and the officer. He described the PMP members in the specific case as understanding their function to be quasi-judicial, and that there was a statutory right of appeal. Knowles J. explained that the PMP members knew they had a duty to act fairly towards all parties, including the duty to be independent and impartial. He highlighted the LQC as understanding his role was to make sure the PMP acted lawfully and fairly. Knowles J. emphasised that the members of the PMP knew it would not be proper for the appropriate authority to instruct, or seek to pressurise, them to reach a particular decision and that if this were given, it would be a serious interference with the administration of justice, and one the PMP must ignore.

Finally, I consider the analysis in Victor to be relevant and helpful. At paragraph 69, Eyre J. emphasised that police officers are office-holders, not employees, and are answerable for the way in which they exercise their powers as a constable. He emphasised the public interest in maintaining an officer’s independence and protecting constables from being at risk of sanction for refusing to comply with potentially unlawful commands (or which would breach their independent exercise of their own judgment). Eyre J. explained that for this reason, a constable has protection going beyond that of other office-holders.

Eyre J. explained that this is a factor of weight but that the public interest in the independence of a constable is not the only relevant public interest. He stated there is a potent public interest in ensuring the highest standards of integrity, professionalism and performance by police officers. At paragraph 71 of his judgment, Eyre J. highlighted the objectives of the PCRs (and the Vetting Code of Practice) are to maintain public confidence in the police service, the upholding of high standards and the protection of the public.

Having taken account of all these matters, and the parties’ submissions, my analysis is that the functions of a PMP are essentially disciplinary functions in respect of conduct matters, performed on behalf of the chief officer of a police force. This is consistent with the legislative powers available to make the relevant conduct regulations, which set out what PMPs must or may do, and how they are to do it. It is consistent with the stated aims and purposes of the police misconduct regime, which is set out in statutory guidance (see paragraphs 128 and 130 above). The SSHD and CoP statutory Guidance are expressly directed at PMP members, and sections 87 and 87A of the 1996 Act allow guidance to be issued to specific persons about discharge of their disciplinary functions, of which PMP members would likely fall within the category of “chief officers of police”. In my assessment, this is consistent with the PMPs acting analogously to agents to the chief officer as their principal (see Eckland at paragraph 43).

As confirmed in Eckland and Victor, the purpose of PMPs is to make decisions about the relationship between the chief police officer and members of their force. This is consistent with the Home Office Review’s recommendation to change the composition of PMPs on the basis that Chief Officers should be given (back) greater responsibility over proceedings relating to their own workforce. It is also an indication that the SSHD exercises her legislative powers to make regulations about how police disciplinary matters are carried out, with the understanding that they relate to disciplinary arrangements within a quasi-employer and employee relationship.

The focus of the SSHD statutory Guidance is on a police misconduct regime operated on behalf of the chief officer in respect of his or her police force. The CoP statutory Guidance confirms the regime has the aims of maintaining public confidence in the police force, upholding policing standards and deterring misconduct and protecting the public. These stated aims and purposes have been incorporated into case law in terms of the aims of the PCRs themselves (see, for example, paragraph 71 of Victor).

In my assessment, it is relevant that the stated aims of the regime and its approach towards misconduct have been taken directly from caselaw about the nature and purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 131 and 132 above). This is consistent with the 2018 Guidance emphasising that the police disciplinary procedures are designed to reflect what is considered to be best practice in other fields of employment (see paragraph 128 above).

Set against this is the emphasis, also in cases such as Eckland, Victor and Wheeler, that PMPs are, and must remain, functionally independent of chief officers of police. The case law highlights the need to have, and to be seen to have, clear blue water of independence between PMP and chief officer and to maintain that independence, as well as emphasising the importance of the public interest of protecting the independence of police officers in performing their duties.

I acknowledge there are differences between a chief officer’s relationship with their police force members compared with a traditional employer / employee relationship, and between police disciplinary proceedings and other types of disciplinary proceedings. I do not, however, accept Mr Goss’s arguments that these differences mean PMPs are exercising the judicial power of the state when carrying out their disciplinary functions.

Firstly, Eckland is confirmation that even if the relationship between chief officer and police officer is determined by a disciplinary system involving an independent body exercising public functions (a PMP), those functions still arise out of, and in the context of a quasi-employment relationship (see paragraph 36 and the footnote to paragraph 46, of Eckland).

Secondly, the argument that the differences present in the police disciplinary system reflect the PMP procedure exercising the judicial power of the state is arguably undermined by the accelerated misconduct hearing / special case hearing procedure used for some police misconduct hearings. For non-senior officers, the accelerated misconduct hearing procedure removes the process of having a PMP entirely and instead uses a single decision-maker through the chief officer (or senior equivalent) of the police force employing the police officer. The chief officer will make findings about conduct and decide the disciplinary action to take.

Mr Goss argued this substantive difference is explained by serious, clearly demonstrated serious misconduct cases justifying the public interest of resolving matters quickly ousting the public interests of protecting police officers’ independence. There are special conditions to satisfy before using the accelerated misconduct hearing procedure, but they are not restricted to admitted misconduct or conviction cases. The SSHD Guidance indicates it is designed for cases where the evidence is incontrovertible in the form of statements, documents or other material (e.g., CCTV), and sufficient, without further evidence to prove gross misconduct (paragraph 12.5 of SSHD Guidance). It is reserved for specific types of case, but the chief officer will still need to make findings about conduct (including where disputed) and disciplinary action.

The SSHD Guidance indicates the key public interest in these cases is to remove the police officer as soon as possible. It may be that this demonstrates one public interest being given particular prominence over another, as Mr Goss argued. However, the difficulty with elevating the public interest in a PMP protecting the independence of police officers to itself indicating the PMP is exercising the judicial power of the state, is what happens when police disciplinary proceedings operate without that specific requirement in place (for example, through the accelerated misconduct hearing procedure).

In my assessment, the specific public interest of maintaining the independence of police officers in their work, and the requirement for functional independence of a PMP as part of this, can more effectively be seen as part of the context within which a PMP is required to apply a “judicial mind” when making its decisions, rather than an indication that a PMP is thereby exercising the judicial power of the state. In my assessment, these types of public interest are also consistent with the aims and purposes taken from other professional disciplinary procedures, identified in the CoP statutory Guidance, set out at paragraphs 131 and 132 above.

The existence and operation of the accelerated misconduct hearing procedure also undermines Mr Goss’s argument that a PMP effectively exercises the judicial power of the state by stepping into, and absorbing, the empty space where employment tribunal proceedings would otherwise operate for an employee. An accelerated misconduct hearing must still apply the standards of balance of probabilities, and an officer is entitled to representation by a police friend or lawyer at the hearing. However, within the PCRs structure, the nature of the single decision-maker, and their role within the police force, emphasises that the decision being made clearly remains one equivalent to an employer (or quasi-employer) deciding whether to discipline or dismiss an employee (office holder).

In any event, I do not consider that police disciplinary proceedings before a PMP represent the equivalent or near equivalent to what would be available through “ordinary” employment tribunal proceedings. Disciplinary outcomes from a PMP hearing could involve a police officer receiving a written warning (including a final one), being reduced in rank or being dismissed without notice. This is the first occasion when such disciplinary outcomes could be applied, rather than an assessment of whether outcomes already applied by the chief officer were ones he or she was entitled to impose. It deals with a stage before the point at which an employee would generally start employment tribunal proceedings. This is consistent with the fact that the PMP is “…doing what would in ordinary circumstances be the responsibility of the chief officer as the quasi-employer” (Eckland, at paragraph 43).

In my assessment, the argument that PMPs reflect the function otherwise available through employment tribunal proceedings also fails to recognise the fact a police officer has a statutory right of appeal to a PAT, as well as how PATs are convened and composed. In terms of composition, the legally qualified chair is drawn from a Home Office list, not a legal policing body list, and the members of the PAT are each entirely separate from the relevant police force. I acknowledge the right of appeal to a PAT is not unlimited, however, there are a broad set of grounds on which an officer may bring an appeal to a PAT, including challenging the findings made by the PMP (or chief officer in an accelerated misconduct hearing) and the outcome it reached, on grounds of reasonableness. In R (Chief Constable of Durham) v Police Appeals Tribunal and others [2012] EWHC 2733, Moses LJ held that the test imposed was not the test of Wednesbury reasonableness but something less, although it did not permit the PAT to substitute its own approach unless it considered the previous (i.e., PMP) decision was unreasonable.

One of Mr Goss’s arguments was that police officers are required to uphold the rule of law and maintain law and order, and almost uniquely, abuse of power by them can directly undermine the rule of law. This argument also drew on the aims of the police misconduct regime summarised at paragraph 130 above, and the public interest in maintaining independence of police officers. I did not, however, find this argument compelling. The assertion about the effects of abuse of power might equally be directed at civil servants, who are required to comply with the Civil Service Code and whose actions uphold (and are also capable of undermining) the rule of law. The disciplinary process for civil servants does not amount to the exercise of the judicial power of the state by reason of what damage could, or might, be done to the rule of law by a civil servant who breaches the Civil Service Code.

In terms of the aims summarised at paragraph 130 above, these have been developed by drawing expressly on case law focusing on the nature and purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings. That case law includes case law about solicitors and chartered accountants. The CoP Guidance on the purpose of misconduct proceedings draws on case law about regulation of doctors that focuses on the reputation or standing of the profession. The development of the police misconduct regime has focused on best practice expected across several different professions. Those professions emphasise the importance of the reputation and integrity of the professions and in maintaining public confidence in them. I did not find his part of Mr Goss’s argument compelling either.

I have also taken into account the suite of legislative changes that have been made to the relevant PCRs since 2015. There is a danger in seeking to define a body’s functions by reference to its processes, which risks straying away from considering the body’s powers and functions, and whether it is exercising the judicial power of the state. In my view, however, the contextual history for the processes used for PMPs is relevant, because it demonstrates a shift towards using LQCs, followed by a decisive shift away from using them, and the reasoning for making those changes.

Mr Goss’s helpful explanation of why this occurred, given the additional context and explanation provided by the Home Office Review, indicates that LQCs were introduced to prevent unduly lenient outcomes, and were, in turn, viewed as having instead contributed to overly lenient outcomes. The Home Office Review emphasised that LQCs had brought much needed levels of independence, transparency and legal fairness to the system, but that Chief Constables should hold the leading role in proceedings to decide whether or not to retain an officer in the force. In my assessment, this demonstrates the relevance of legally qualified persons bringing a judicial mind to a PMP’s decision-making, rather than confirming it is exercising the judicial power of the state. It also indicates that a key purpose of the involvement of a PMP remains to allow Chief Constables to lead disciplinary proceedings in respect of their police officers.

I have also taken into account other changes in the processes that the PCRs provide for PMPs. Mr Goss’s skeleton argument argued that when analysed properly, the procedural powers of a PMP support it being a court, using examples of a power to impose reporting restrictions of regulation 31(6)(b) of the PCRs 2012, and regulation 39(3) of the PCRs 2020. Mr Goss also referred in his skeleton argument to these powers allowing a PMP to confer anonymity on a witness and that it happened with the particular PMP in respect of which Rabbi Kanter-Webber sought information.

Mr Goss argued that if a PMP is exercising the judicial power of the state, then the orders a PMP might make have teeth, as breach of them could be punished by the High Court’s jurisdiction in cases of contempt. He argued that if PMPs are not courts within the meaning of section 32 of FOIA then reporting restrictions could be breached with impunity and witnesses could never be given clear assurances as to anonymity (but would need to be considered under the balancing test in section 40 of FOIA).

Regulation 39(3)(c) of the PCRs 2020 provides a power to prohibit publication of specific matters (which Mr Goss described as a reporting restrictions power). There is no equivalent dedicated power in the PCRs 2012. I do not agree that regulation 31(6)(b) of the PCRs 2012 provides one. Regulation 31(6)(b) is the same provision as regulation 39(3)(b) of the PCRs 2020. If the legislators had thought that the power in regulation 39(3)(b) were sufficient to allow a PMP to make a reporting restrictions order, it is unlikely they would have drafted a dedicated power for it in regulation 39(3)(c). This indicates that in the absence of a specific power in the PCRs 2012, the 2012 regulations did not give PMPs the power to make a reporting restrictions order. This is also signalled by the differences in the headings for the two sets of regulations. The heading of regulation 31 of the PCRs 2012 makes no reference to reporting restrictions, but the heading of regulation 39 of the PCRs 2020 does.

In my assessment, the PCRs 2012 did not provide PMPs with a power to make a reporting restrictions order. They have been given that power in matters covered by the PCRs 2020. It does not provide for a specific method of enforcement. I agree with Mr Davidson that other powers in the conduct regulations are effectively self-policing. See, for example, regulation 39(4) of the PCRs 2020 allowing a PMP chair to require attendees at a hearing to withdraw while evidence is given containing information in regulation 39(7). This means a hearing will not continue until the person has withdrawn. Mr Goss referred to the PMP in this appeal making an anonymity order. Again, there is no clear provision given in the PCRs for enforcing that order.

I consider it relevant that the Second Respondent is unaware of any proceedings where action has been taken under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 for a breach of a PMP’s order. I recognise that there has been a period of just over 5 years for reporting restrictions ones to be made, rather than the longer period since the PCRs 2012 came into force. It appears, however, that the Second Respondent had not considered the issue of contempt of court relevant to PMPs before this appeal and, when asked about it, initially considered it largely to be a distraction. It is unusual for a PMP to exercise the judicial power of the state without police forces knowing it is doing so for the purposes of considering contempt of court proceedings to protect its orders. Nor do the legislators drafting the relevant regulations (including substantial amendments in recent years) appear to have viewed PMPs as exercising the judicial power of the state.

I agree with Mr Davidson’s submission that Mr Goss’s argument places the metaphorical cart before the metaphorical horse. The cart is that protection such as contempt of court is needed to guard against breaches of orders. The horse is that the body exercises the judicial power of the state. It is the consequence of a body exercising the judicial power of the state that its orders should be capable of protection (and in the event of breach, that such breaches are dealt with effectively). I do not accept Mr Goss’s argument that PMPs should be seen as exercising the judicial power of the state on the basis that it is desirable or important for their orders to have contempt of court protection.