the Evidence
55 . We have set out above the legal tests which must be applied to our assessment of the evidence in this case. We should emphasise that we have done no more than note the O mbudsperson’s report as background , but have not based our reasoning or conclusions on it, given the different standard of proof, different evidence and different legal test with which s he was concerned. What she has to say is c learly of interest but it can in no sense be a guide to us as to how we determine this appeal. We have considered the evidence otherwise in the round. We have not just looked at the extracts provided by the Secretary of State from the appellant’s speeches but looked at the broader content to be found in the full translations provided by the appellant. We see no materiality to any differences between the translations except as to the instances that we refer to specifically below. We consider that the language used by the appellant is such that it can properly be characterised as explicit direct encouragement or incitement to acts of terrorism (which we use as shorthand for Article 1F(c)), given the very significant equation to be made, and which we find to exist in this case, between terrorism and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations: see Section 54(1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (set out at paragraph 8 above). In the alternative, knowing incitement and encouragement can be implicit as well as explicit. It is a quest ion of degree. The reference to Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and the praise given to them in the post of 20 July 2006 and the particular praise of bin Laden in the YouTube interview of 2 May 2011 give a context to the appellant’s remarks as a whole. In that interview on the day of bin Laden’s death the appellant referred to bin Laden as a lion among the lions of Islam who left for Jihad, and was loved by millions of people from the Ummah. In light of bin Laden’s history the statement that “ bin Laden did not kill civilians and did not say that ” has to be taken in context. It cannot be seen as in effect justifying or clarifying everything else said by the appellant about bin Laden or otherwise. It simply flies in the face of reality. We do not accept that this is a belief that the appellant could rationally claim to have held. On any understanding bin Laden was the mastermind behind terrorist attacks such as those in New York on 11 September 2001, in which very significant numbers of civilians died. The appellant simply chose to ignore the point made to him by the interviewer that bin Laden used to boast about and call for military operations including those that targeted civilians in the W est. He simply avoided that question and came out with a statement subsequen tly about bin Laden not killing civilians which is untrue and which we consider he must have known to be untrue. 56 . The further eulogies of bin Laden , Zawahiri and Al-Libi to which we ha ve referred to above also form part of a climate of praise for and glorification of the activit ies of these people. Taken together with the applauding of the intern al reach and aspirations of Al-Q aeda and in particular the targeting of attacks on the USA, they can be seen as background to and part of the more specific matters referred to in Mr O’Connor’s third category of case. In referring to bin Laden having “ handed over the banner to a generation that will eliminate this falsehood ” , and that the Muslims will be victo rious in Afghanistan and Iraq; the reference to “if you have killed one Osama the womb of the Ummah will still contain a thousand times a thousand Osamas, and the further eu logistic remarks and the post of 2 May 2011 concerning the inspiration to ordinary Muslims that bin Laden represents to people in the various places cited there, together with the 14 October 2011 eulogy to Al-Awlaki referring to his words having been taken up by thousands of young people or a thousand Al-Awlakis and that the womb of the Ummah is fruitful ; that one better than Al-Awlaki has already been killed and martyred, and the rhetorical question : did the Jihad stop , and d oes the Ummah die with the death of its leaders, we consider this is sufficient as contended on behalf of the Secretary of State to amount to at least implicit and indeed explicit encouragement and inducement to the a ppellant’s audience to emulate these people in their activities which are activities of terrorism and activities contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Consequently we consider that the respondent has made out her case. We do not consider that these words can be taken as falling short of the test as contended by Mr Mackenzie. These are s tatements comprising incitement and encouragement made by a man who se words , in our view , clearly cross the border of implicit encouragement and incitement and indeed amount to explicit encouragement and incitement such that his actions fall within the exclusion clause as set out in Article 1F(c) and as expressed in the Qualification Directive in Article 12(2)(c). 57 . Accordingly his appeal is dismissed. 58. No anonymity direction is made . Signed
Date
Upper Tribunal Judge Allen
- DECISION AND REASONS
- The Law
- Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department
- Pushpanathan v Canada, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
- Al-Sirri
- R (on the application of JS) (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
- Tadic
- KJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD
- the Evidence
- Upper Tribunal
- Before
- Between
- Appellant
- Representation
- DETERMINATION AND REASONS
- Grounds of Appeal
- Al-Sirri v Secretary of State
- The FTT’s Approach
- Submissions for Secretary of State
- Submissions for the Appellant
- Decision on Ground 1 – Standard of proof
- AH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
- Ground 2
- Youssef v Foreign Secretary
- MN (Somalia) v Secretary of State
- Decision on Ground 2
- Further Procedure
- DIRECTIONS
