[2024] UKUT 00144 (IAC)

The appellant maintained the deception that he was an asylum seeker from Kosovo in the initial asylum application, the application for further leave to remain, and the application for naturalisation. At no point during that process did he disclose to the respondent that he knowingly made a false application for asylum (as opposed to an application that was simply unsuccessful).

In relation to the first ground, we conclude that the judge’s reliance on Sleiman was misplaced for the reasons explained above. The fact that the respondent exercised discretion to grant the appellant leave to remain following a series of mistakes did not break a chain of causation when the full facts were not known at the time. The judge failed to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that the exercise of discretion to grant ILR might have been different had the full facts been known. The judge failed to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that naturalisation was ‘obtained by means of’ a dishonest concealment of a fact that was likely to be material to the assessment of the good character requirement when the appellant applied for naturalisation in 2007.

In relation to the second ground, we conclude that, despite a self-direction to the balancing exercise required under Article 8, the decision is devoid of any assessment of the weight to be given to the public interest considerations relating to deprivation of citizenship.

For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The whole decision is set aside. The normal course of action would be for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision even if it involves making findings of fact. We see no reason to depart from that course. The decision will be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.