Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

[2024] UKUT 00144 (IAC)

Fecha: 08-Ago-2023

Having considered the framework of statute, policy and case law, Judge Canavan and I directed ourselves to this effect

Having considered the framework of statute, policy and case law, Judge Canavan and I directed ourselves to this effect:

(i)

Each case is fact sensitive. In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘good character’, the starting point is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether a person is of good character for the purpose of granting citizenship under section 6(1) and Schedule 1 BNA 1981.

(ii)

Any negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character is likely to be directly material to the assessment of the statutory requirement, whether it played a role in the application for naturalisation itself or took place before the application.

(iii)

In the majority of cases where negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character has been dishonestly concealed from the Secretary of State, the fact that the negative behaviour might not have been directly relevant to an earlier grant of leave is unlikely to make any material difference to the assessment under section 40(3) BNA 1981. It is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether the negative behaviour might have made a material difference to the assessment of good character under section 6(1) BNA 1981 had the information been known at the time.

(iv)

The omission of a fact that might have cast doubt on whether a person is of good character when they applied for naturalisation is likely to be material to the question of whether a person ‘obtained’ citizenship by the dishonest concealment of a material fact for the purpose of section 40(3) BNA 1981.

(v)

The concept of a chain of causation being broken is only likely to be relevant in cases where there was full disclosure and the Secretary of State exercised discretion to grant leave to remain or naturalisation while in full possession of the facts.

(vi)

The decision in Sleiman was based on limited argument and should be read in the full context of the statutory scheme and other relevant case law.

Applying that approach, we found an error of law in the approach of the First-tier Tribunal below. The fact that the respondent exercised discretion to grant the appellant leave to remain following a series of mistakes did not break a chain of causation when the full facts were not known at the time. The judge failed to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that the exercise of discretion to grant ILR might have been different had the full facts been known. As to the human rights ground of appeal, we found that the First-tier Tribunal decision was devoid of any assessment of the weight to be given to the public interest considerations relating to deprivation of citizenship.