Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

[2024] UKUT 00144 (IAC)

Fecha: 08-Ago-2023

Taking the approach in Chimi [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC) to the relevant issues, I should consider these questions

16.

Taking the approach in Chimi [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC) to the relevant issues, I should consider these questions:

(a)

Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when deciding that the condition precedent in s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was satisfied? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,

(b)

Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when deciding to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of British citizenship? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,

(c)

Weighing the lawfully determined deprivation decision against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant, is the decision unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed on human rights grounds. If not, the appeal falls to be dismissed.

17.

I do not find the Secretary of State erred in law as to the condition precedent in s40(3) BNA 1981. The Appellant maintained a fraud throughout his residence in the UK. He did not make full disclosure of the relevant circumstances either at the ILR or citizenship stage of his history. There was nothing in the decision-making history to break the causative link between his fraud and the grant of citizenship. There was no exercise of discretion in his favour made with full knowledge of the relevant facts. The omission of a material fact in the naturalisation application is likely to be material to obtaining citizenship by dishonest concealment such that “naturalisation was obtained by means of … fraud”, and on the facts here, I so find. Nor was there any material error of law in the context of discretion to deprive. The considerations identified in the refusal letter were perfectly relevant ones and no material factor was overlooked.

18.

The submissions provided by OTS Solicitors do not dissuade me from this conclusion. Those essentially invited me to depart from the legal directions made at the error of law stage. It will be rare for such an invitation to be taken up, but of course if the arguments made were sufficiently persuasive it is possible that I would accede to them. However I decline to do so.

(a)

I do not accept that the reference in Chapter 55 to knowledge of the relevant facts at the time the citizenship application was considered in any way limits the relevance of events leading to the grant of indefinite leave to remain. To do so would blind the Home Office to relevant considerations going to good character, contrary to a central tenet of good public law decision making.

(b)

The “real world” backdrop to the case indubitably includes the appellant’s historic and prolonged dishonesty.

(c)

The appellant's very presence in the UK was predicated on a false asylum claim and the delays and mistakes in his case arose in that context.

(d)

I do not accept that the fact that Shyti involved old Immigration Rule 395C, which expressly identified good character as a relevant consideration, indicates that discretionary decision making would exclude good character as a material criteria. I cannot envisage a rational administrative system excluding good character as relevant, at least absent an express statement to such effect.

19.

The remaining issue on the appeal is the compatibility of the deprivation decision with the appellant's private and family life. He has lived in the UK for significantly over 20 years and has a partner; their three young children are British citizens. I have no doubt he and his family are fully integrated into the life in the UK. The skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal is very vague as to the precise impact that loss of citizenship might have on the family. It would not of course involve the appellant’s expulsion from the UK: his future is dependent on a further immigration decision, to be taken in the future, after a period of not more than a few months.