UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2024-000010 - [2024] UKUT 00416 (TCC)

The Applicant argued that there should be privacy because the publication of the Decision Notices would “destroy” her reputation (with slightly different formulations of the same point used elsewhere in her representations). In support of this argument, the Applicant refers to the allegation that she lacked competence in “combination with” the integrity allegation.

I reject this ground in isolation or as an additional factor weighing against publication for the reasons submitted by Mr Pritchard on behalf of the Authority.

The concern about the Applicant’s reputation is not a cogent ground in support of the Privacy Applications.

The Applicant’s worry about her reputation is unsupported by cogent evidence (indeed, there is no supportive evidence at all). Mere assertions as to the possibility of reputational harm are insufficient to displace the presumption in favour of publication and embarrassment to an applicant that could result from publicity, and that it might draw the Applicant’s clients and others to ask questions which the Applicant would rather not answer, does not amount to unfairness.

The only matter cited in support of her reputation argument is the seriousness of the findings outlined in the Decision Notices. However, that is not relevant to any consideration of unfairness. The findings outlined in the Decision Notices are substantive issues that will be addressed in due course before the Tribunal. The Applicant has the right to challenge those findings, a right which she has exercised. If the Tribunal finds in her favour, the Applicant will receive a decision or judgment vindicating her position. Further, if the Applicant’s Decision Notice is published, it will make clear on its face that the findings therein are subject to challenge. It will also contain a summary of the Applicant’s representations denying the allegations.

It is also relevant to the Applicant’s concerns about her reputation that there is already a lot of information in the public domain referring to criticisms of the advice the Applicant gave. This is explained above.

In the circumstances, it is apparent that the Applicant’s alleged lack of competence or misconduct is already in the public domain and therefore her reputation will have already been impacted by such matters. Indeed, per Prodhan at [25], “[t]he fact that some information concerning the subject matter of a reference is already in the public domain is a factor which tends in favour of publication”.

The Applicant’s representations do not begin to explain why the publication of the Decision Notices will have a greater impact on her reputation than the materials already in the public domain, or why that reputational impact means that there is a significant likelihood of severe damage. It is also worth noting that the Applicant’s business, HDIFA, is no longer in operation so publication will not cause additional financial or reputational damage to her business.