UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2024-000098 - [2025] UKUT 00247 (TCC)
Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber

UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2024-000098 - [2025] UKUT 00247 (TCC)

Fecha: 21-May-2025

Conclusions

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

105.

For the reasons set out above, we allow the appeal against the Decision of the FTT and set it aside based upon material errors of law. We re-make the decision dismissing the Respondent’s appeal against HMRC’s Assessment. We confirm that HMRC is entitled in law to recover from the Respondent the sums paid to him by way of SEISS in respect of the First and Second Claims.

POSTSCRIPT

106.

The Respondent was an unrepresented litigant in person. In the run up to the hearing he had not provided a skeleton argument in accordance with the direction that one should be filed and served 7 days before. The Tribunal therefore explained to him in ordinary language in an email dated 16 May 2025 what type of information a skeleton argument might be expected to include on an appeal to the UT.

107.

The Respondent filed at the UT and served upon HMRC the first draft of his skeleton argument on 20 May 2025, the day before the hearing. This contained reference to three previous decisions purportedly made by the FTT which were said to support the Respondent’s interpretation of the legislation. Paragraphs 22-25 of this draft of his skeleton stated:

22.

In Patel v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 138 (TC), the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) found that HMRC's SEISS guidance was unclear at the time of the claim and that a claimant's reasonable belief in eligibility, based on that guidance, could be considered. The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part.

23.

In Ali v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 329 (TC), the Tribunal found that the Appellant reasonably relied on their accountant's advice and HMRC's guidance. The FTT held that this context was relevant to the statutory interpretation.

24.

In Kamran v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 91 (TC), the Tribunal noted the continuity of work before and after the SEISS claim and applied a purposive approach to paragraph 4.2 of the SEISS Direction. The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) allowed the appeal in part, finding that the claimant continued the same trade.

25.

These authorities demonstrate that the First-tier Tribunal can take a holistic view when determining eligibility under SEISS legislation, including the clarity of HMRC's guidance and the taxpayer's reasonable understanding.

108.

In preparation for the hearing HMRC searched public and internal databases to check the decisions purportedly made by the FTT as relied upon by the Respondent. They discovered that the cases referred to by the Respondent do not exist.

109.

On HMRC challenging the Respondent, he filed and served an amended and final skeleton argument later the same day with these paragraphs removed. During the hearing the Respondent accepted that he had used online Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) software to assist him with his written submissions.

110.

The Divisional Court has recently given guidance of the use of AI in court proceedings: see Ayinde, R (On the Application Of) v Qatar National Bank QPSC & Anor [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) (“Ayinde”). Much of the guidance applies equally to tribunal proceedings. The focus of the judgment is upon the use of AI by lawyers or legal representatives rather than unrepresented litigants. The court notes at [15]-[16]:

15.Guidance is also given to judges about the use of artificial intelligence. That guidance, first provided in December 2023 and updated in April 2025, is published on the judiciary's website.[4] Its contents are as relevant to the use of artificial intelligence by lawyers as they are to its use by the judiciary. It makes clear that it is necessary to uphold confidentiality and privacy by not entering into a public artificial intelligence tool any information that is not already in the public domain. It also makes clear that it is necessary to check any information that is provided by an artificial intelligence tool before it is used or relied upon. It further emphasises the need to be aware that artificial intelligence tools may make up fictitious cases, citations or quotes, or refer to legislation, articles or legal texts that do not exist, or provide incorrect or misleading information regarding the law or how it might apply, or make factual errors.

16.Importantly, the guidance says that: "All legal representatives are responsible for the material they put before the court/tribunal and have a professional obligation to ensure it is accurate and appropriate." It warns about the risks of using generative artificial intelligence for legal research or legal analysis: "Legal research: AI tools are a poor way of conducting research to find new information you cannot verify independently. They may be useful as a way to be reminded of material you would recognise as correct. Legal analysis: the current public AI chatbots do not produce convincing analysis or reasoning."

111.

The updated guidance for judicial office holders of 14 April 2025 includes a section “3. Guidance for responsible use of AI in Courts and Tribunals”. Paragraph 7 is titled “Be aware that court/tribunal users may have used AI tools” and includes the following guidance:

“AI chatbots are now being used by unrepresented litigants. They may be the only source of advice or assistance some litigants receive. Litigants rarely have the skills independently to verify legal information provided by AI chatbots and may not be aware that they are prone to error. If it appears an AI chatbot may have been used to prepare submissions or other documents, it is appropriate to inquire about this, ask what checks for accuracy have been undertaken (if any), and inform the litigant that they are responsible for what they put to the court/tribunal. Examples of indications that text has been produced this way are shown below.”

112.

We repeat this guidance in relation to unrepresented litigants. The accuracy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) should not be relied upon without checking, particularly when it comes to statements or arguments that it makes concerning the law. There is a danger that unarguable submissions or inaccurate or even fictitious information or references may be generated. Unrepresented parties, just as legal representatives, remain responsible for the accuracy, both the reliability and credibility, of the information, both evidence and submissions, they present to the FTT or UT.

113.

In this case, HMRC was put to the trouble of having to investigate the existence of the purported decisions relied upon by the Respondent. Fortunately, they did so. Depending on the circumstances, there may be occasions when the opposing party or the tribunal are not able to discover the errors relied upon. There may be others where an adjournment is required to investigate or address the inaccurate information.

114.

On these facts, we do not consider the Respondent to be highly culpable because he is not legally trained or qualified, not subject to the same duties as a regulated lawyer or other professional representative and may not have understood that the information and submissions presented were not simply unreliable but fictitious. He was under time pressure given his other competing responsibilities and doing his best as a lay litigant seeking to assist the UT by preparing written submissions.

115.

Nonetheless, in the appropriate case the UT may take such matters very seriously. Sanctions available for the misuse of AI by a party or representative are highlighted in Ayinde at [23]-[31]. Many of these sanctions are available to the UT.

JUDGE RUPERT JONES JUDGE VIMAL TILAKAPALA

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGES

DATE RELEASED: 24 July 2025