AC-2024-LON-003550 - [2025] EWHC 2831 (Admin)

Section 14 of the Act provides a time bar to extradition in cases where surrender would be “unjust or oppressive” by reason of “the passage of time”. Section 14 provides as relevant:

“Passage of time

A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time [since he is alleged to have—

(a)

committed the extradition offence (where he is accused of its commission), or

(b)

become unlawfully at large (where he is alleged to have been convicted of it)”

The appellant submits that the Judge erred in rejecting the section 14 bar submission. The appellant observes that he was arrested on the first arrest warrant on 12 November 2017 and discharged from those warrants on 24 January 2019. As a consequence, it is submitted, once he has been arrested (and remanded) he is no longer a “fugitive” as he is not knowingly putting himself beyond the reach of the Polish judicial authorities. Thus, the period of time between arrest in 2017 to the date of the appeal hearing, is said to be relevant under the oppression aspect of section 14.

The appellant further relies on the well-known passage in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779 at 783:

“As respects delay which is not brought about by the acts of the accused himself, however, the question of where responsibility lies for the delay is not generally relevant. What matters is not so much the cause of such delay as its effect; or, rather, the effects of those events which would not have happened before the trial of the accused if it had taken place with ordinary promptitude.

…

My Lords, in the chronology of events that I have summarised which extends over some four and three-quarter years from April 5, 1973, to December 16, 1977, the failure of the prosecuting authorities to begin criminal proceedings against Mr. Kakis during the first 15 months until the coup in July 1974 was due to his own action in going into hiding in the mountains. So the starting point for the period of time that requires to be considered is July 1974.”

Lord Diplock stated that delay attributable to the accused fleeing the requesting state, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest, cannot be relied upon to resist extradition due to injustice or oppression. The essential thrust of the appellant’s argument is succinctly captured at para 33 of his skeleton argument:

“It is submitted that there is a tension here between someone coming to the UK without the [judicial authorities’] knowledge and in breach of a condition to notify a change of address in 2015 where the Appellant could be considered a fugitive. And, following arrest and remand and discharge in this jurisdiction where the [judicial authorities] knew the Appellant was in the UK that he can ‘still’ be considered a fugitive. The Appellant is within reach of the legal process in Poland as the Polish authorities know where he is and can seek his request to return (following proper legal process under the Extradition Act 2003).”

The respondent submits that this analysis is misconceived. The appellant came to the United Kingdom as fugitive; he remains one. The Judge was correct to reject the section 14 time bar. He was at all times a fugitive.

I examine first the fugitivity question and then the dispute between the parties about section 14.