AC-2024-LON-003550 - [2025] EWHC 2831 (Admin)

This is an appeal in extradition proceedings.

The case raises issues about key aspects of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) and associated jurisprudence, including section 10 on double criminality; section 20 on rights waiver through deliberate absenting; section 14 on delay, oppression and fugitivity; and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The appeal is against an extradition order made by District Judge Tempia (“the Judge”) sitting at the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 28 October 2024. The Judge ordered the return of the appellant Piotr Jan Zebracki (“the appellant” or “the requested person”), a Polish national born in Poland on 6 June 1985 and now aged 40, back to Poland (“the requesting state”). The respondent in the appeal is the Regional Court in Torun, Republic of Poland (“the judicial authority”). The order is made under section 21 of the Act. Poland is a Category 1 territory under the Act and thus extradition is governed by Part 1 of the statute, with the initial decision to be made by a district judge, as has happened here. Such an extradition order may be appealed to the High Court with leave (under section 26). Permission was granted on a limited basis by Ritchie J on the papers on 22 May 2025.

The requesting state seeks the appellant’s surrender on a conviction warrant issued under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 2020 (“TACA”) on 21 January 2019. It was certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 7 January 2022. Therefore, it should be noted, that there was a delay of almost three years before certification, a fact I must return to. The warrant seeks the appellant’s return to Poland to serve an outstanding sentence following a complicated series of events that will be set out in brief below. Put shortly, however, the parties agree that the appellant has 207 days’ imprisonment still to serve of an aggregated sentence of 3 years and 8 months’ custody for a series of ten offences in Poland between 2012 and 2015. They were principally offences of dishonesty, including burglary, fraud, forgery and theft, along with a driving offence.

The appellant does not consent to his extradition. The grounds Ritchie J granted permission on are under section 10 of the Act and article 8 of the ECHR. First, it is submitted that one of the offences founding the custodial sentence is not an “extradition offence” for the purposes of section 65(3)(b) which requires that “the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom”. Second, surrender is opposed on the basis of article 8 on the basis that a return order would amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s family life and that of his family and thus is incompatible with article 8.

Ritchie J refused permission on grounds arguing sections 14 and 20 of the Act. At the appeal hearing, the appellant renewed the permission application. I heard argument as a preliminary issue and granted permission. The merits of these further grounds are fully discussed below. I set out the relevant passages from the Judge’s lower court judgment under the relevant ground rather than providing an extended block of text at the outset.

The structure adopted is to examine the grounds in the order counsel jointly proposed to argue them. The relevant grounds, as reordered, are:

The appellant is represented by Ms Herbert of counsel; the respondent by Ms Beatty. I am grateful to both counsel for their economical and spirited submissions.