AC-2024-LON-003550 - [2025] EWHC 2831 (Admin)

The submission on “whereabouts” is incorrect. The argument is that the appellant ceased being a fugitive “as his whereabouts were from that point known” and that “he is a fugitive up until the authorities know where he is”, whether that is November 2017 (first arrest warrant) or 2019 (reissued arrest warrant).

The submission would entail that every fugitive from justice would cease to have fugitive status upon arrest and the ascertaining of her or his whereabouts. The ascertaining of whereabouts may affect fugitivity if there are subsequent proceedings in the requesting state, but not those already initiated. The fallacy in the argument arises from a failure to recognise that concealing whereabouts is a relevant act for the action element of the elements of fugitivity, but not the only relevant action and the concept is a subjective one about what the requested person did and why it was done in evading justice (if that is the case). One must examine the facts in the round and examine the requested person’s actions in respect of already-initiated legal processes in the requesting state.

Here the Judge made a finding that the appellant “deliberately and knowingly put himself beyond the reach of the legal process”. It was inevitable that she made such a finding. I have in Ground 2 discussed the appellant’s state of mind and actions and confirmed that the Judge was correct to conclude that for the case file II K 779/12 (the burglary and handling offences in 2012) he deliberately absented himself. For the 2014 burglaries and thefts, he was represented by a lawyer and attended the trial on 15 May 2015. He said he was not sure whether he was convicted but “yes probably” (para 38). For the II K 271/16 forgery and fraud offences, he agreed that he admitted guilt in a (presumably police) interview and agreed the appropriate sentence with the prosecutor (para 39). With this background, it is inevitable that the Judge found that he “knowingly and deliberately put himself beyond the reach of the [Polish] legal process” (para 42).

When he came to the United Kingdom, he changed his address from the Polish one he had notified to the Polish authorities. He did not inform them of the change. His whereabouts were then unknown. Once he was arrested in the United Kingdom, his whereabouts became known. On arrest, he was not ceasing in his attempts to evade Polish justice, but had been apprehended and detained in the country he had fled to. It cannot be right that every person detained in a state of flight ceases to be a fugitive on arrest in that second state which is beyond the reach of the requesting state’s legal process. Everyone would cease being a fugitive on such arrest and fugitivity established for the already-initiated legal process that has been evaded is eradicated by the act of discovery. Simply stating that bare consequence reveals the argument’s inherent flaw. The submission is misconceived.