AC-2024-LON-003550 - [2025] EWHC 2831 (Admin)

As a reminder, the significance under the Act of being a fugitive is that, save in exceptional circumstances, it prevents the fugitive relying on delay as a bar to extradition because of injustice or oppression under section 14. The concept of fugitivity was considered by the Divisional Court in Wisniewski v Poland [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin) (“Wisniewski”) at para 58, per Lloyd Jones LJ (as he then was). The court said:

“58.

‘Fugitive’ is not a statutory term but a concept developed in the case law, in particular in Gomes's case [2009] 1 WLR 1038 which elaborates the principle stated in Kakis's case [1978] 1 WLR 779 . In the context of Part 1 of the 2003 Act it describes a status which precludes reliance on the passage of time under section 14. Before this rule can apply, a person's status as a fugitive must be established to the criminal standard; Gomes's case, para.27.

59.

…Where a person has knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of a legal process he cannot invoke the passage of time resulting from such conduct on his part to support the existence of a statutory bar to extradition. Rather than seeking to provide a comprehensive definition of a fugitive for this purpose, it is likely to be more fruitful to consider the applicability of this principle on a case by case basis …”

Two Divisional Court judgments further assist in understanding the concept of fugitivity: Pillar-Neumann and Versluis v the Netherlands [2019] EWHC 764 (Admin) (“Pillar-Neumann”) and De Zorzi v France [2019] EWHC 2062 (Admin) (“De Zorzi”). It will assist to summarise the court’s reasoning in these cases to illustrate the proper approach to the assessment of fugitivity, while always remembering that the status is highly fact-sensitive.