AC-2024-LON-002673 - [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)

The Appellant’s submission that the Judge made an error of law in failing to give “the greatest weight” to the best interests of his son and step-daughters is based on a misconception as to the law. As Counsel for the Appellant, Dr Muin Boase acknowledged in his oral submissions, the law does not require the best interests of a child to be treated as “the paramount consideration”; and as I have explained above (para 35), the court is not precluded from finding, on examination, that another factor (here, the public interest in extradition) is weightier than the best interests of the child.

The Appellant’s contention that the Judge erred in not treating the best interests of each child as “the starting point”, is also based on a misconception as to the law. As I have said (para 34), the law does not impose a requirement that the child’s interests must be considered first.

I reject the contention that in assessing whether the Appellant’s extradition would be a proportionate interference with the relevant article 8 rights, the Judge failed properly to consider the best interests of each child for the following reasons.

The Judge made no error of law in his legal directions, correctly drawing his own attention to the “important guidance” in relation to the rights of dependant children given by the Supreme Court in HH v Italy.

In paragraph 52, the Judge did not refer to the interests of each child as a factor in favour of refusing extradition. That was an omission. But it is inconsequential in light of the fact that he had set out the evidence regarding each of the children, correctly directed himself to carefully weigh the article 8 rights of “any dependant children” (as well as of the Appellant and his partner), and then in his assessment at paragraph 53 he expressly addressed the impact on “the children of the family”, and the financial impact on the Appellant’s son.

The Judge did not state in terms that it was in “the best interests” of David, Alexandra and Michaela, given their attachment to the Appellant, that he remains in the UK. But in my view that is obviously implicit in his finding that the Appellant’s extradition would cause “hardship” to “the children of the family”. In paragraph 53(vi), the Judge separately addressed the impact on the living arrangements and financial security of his son (and his partner), those being matters which did not affect his stepdaughters. It is plain that in paragraph 53(iv) the Judge was addressing the emotional rather than practical impact on each of the children.

I do not consider that the Judge can fairly be criticised for addressing the interests of the children in relatively brief terms (see paragraph 32 above). In a case such as this, the Judge was entitled to swiftly reject the suggested incompatibility. There were no unusually or exceptionally compelling features:

In any event, it is important to focus on the question whether the Judge’s decision was wrong. I have no hesitation in concluding that the Judge was not wrong (indeed, in my view, he was clearly correct) to find that the factors militating against the Appellant’s extradition were substantially outweighed by the factors in favour of his extradition.

The most important factor in favour of discharge was the best interests of the Appellant’s son. That was bolstered to some extent by the interests of his stepdaughters, and his own and his partner’s rights to private and family life, in circumstances where he had led a law-abiding and settled life, living and working in the UK since 2017. The Judge also considered in the Appellant’s favour that there was some “Brexit uncertainty” and that he had been required to abide by a four-hour curfew as part of his bail conditions. But neither is a weighty factor, and in particular the curfew (which Dr Boase emphasised) was short and so would have had little impact on the Appellant’s ability to live his life, save to prevent late-evening socialising outside his home.

On the other side of the scales was first, and most significantly in this case, the high public importance of the UK not being a safe haven for the Appellant, who was a fugitive from justice, having fled the Czech Republic following his trial and sentencing hearing, and breached the probation conditions on which the suspended sentence was imposed. Secondly, the public interest in the UK honouring its treaty obligations, and the Appellant being extradited to serve the sentence for the crimes of which he was convicted carries great weight. This is not a case where it is diminished by delay or the nature of the criminal conduct. The Judge made no error in assessing that, particularly in view of his previous convictions for dishonesty, the criminal conduct in respect of which his extradition is sought is serious. The fact that a suspended sentence was initially imposed does not assist him in circumstances where he breached the terms of his sentence, resulting in the activation of the sentence.

I do not underestimate the impact of the Appellant’s extradition on him and his family, especially his young son. But contrary to Mr Boase’s submission, this was not a borderline case. Whether considered individually or cumulatively, the consequences of the Appellant’s extradition for each of the children, for his partner, and for the Appellant, were far from “unusually or exceptionally compelling”. And they were heavily outweighed by the public interest in extradition of a fugitive to serve the sentence for the crimes of which he was convicted.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.