AC-2024-LON-002673 - [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)
Administrative Court

AC-2024-LON-002673 - [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)

Fecha: 10-Nov-2025

Electronically monitored curfew

Electronically monitored curfew

36.

In Leszczynski v Regional Court in Warsaw, Poland [2025] EWHC 1024 (Admin), having considered a substantial number of cases where the issue of time spent on an electronically monitored curfew had been considered (including two authorities on which the Appellant relies: Prusianu v Romania [2022] EWHC 1929, [2023] 1 WLR 495 and Toma v Moreni Court (Romania) [2024] EWHC 183 (Admin)), Morris J held at [47]:

“From these authorities, I derive the following principles:

(1)

For the purposes of domestic law on sentencing, ‘qualifying curfew’ is an electronically monitored curfew of at least 9 hours duration a day. However, it is clear that, in an extradition case, both qualifying curfew and non-qualifying curfew (i.e. less than 9 hours duration per day) in the UK is capable of being a factor properly to be taken into account in the Article 8 balancing exercise: Hojden [[2022] EWHC 2725 (Admin)] §49.

(2)

What falls to be assessed is the degree of the deprivation of liberty or restriction on freedom of movement and autonomy: Prusianu §49. This might arise both from an electronically monitored curfew and from an obligation to report to a police station (Einikis [2014] EWHC 2325 (Admin)]) (or perhaps other bail conditions) or a combination of these elements. The court will consider whether the curfew has had a material effect on a person's ability to work, study or maintain family life, in which case the curfew will be afforded greater weight (than, for example, merely preventing late-evening socialising): Hojden §50.

(3)

Each case turns on its own facts. The assessment of a curfew as a relevant factor and the overall balance is an intensely fact-specific exercise: Polom [2024] EWHC 2708 (Admin)] §44. Little is to be gained by comparing the facts of previous cases. The cases vary as regards the seriousness of the underlying offence, the length of sentence to be served, the number of hours of the daily curfew and the amount of time that the requested person has been subject to that curfew.

(4)

In the cited cases where curfew was considered, in some cases, extradition was ordered; in others it was taken into account as a factor which led to extradition being discharged. As a matter of fact, the shortest curfew duration which has been taken into account in the cases referred to above, was a curfew of 4 hours in the case of Prusianu.

(5)

Amongst the factors relevant to the court considering the issue is whether or not it has before it evidence as to how the requesting state will deal with the time spent under UK curfew: see, for example, Polom §44.

(6)

As a matter of general principle, where the public interest in extradition is otherwise very strong, time spent on curfew is unlikely to tip the balance against extradition. On the other hand, in a case which is otherwise marginal, time spent on curfew might tip the balance against extradition.”