AC-2024-LON-002673 - [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)

The extradition hearing took place on 12 July 2024. The Appellant gave written and oral evidence. Ms Vlckova’s witness statement was unchallenged. In his judgment dated 2 August 2024 (‘the Judgment’), the Judge set out in detail the evidence regarding the Appellant’s family, and in particular regarding his son and two stepdaughters, at paragraphs 14, 17 and 20-22.

The Judge was entirely satisfied that the Appellant is a fugitive from justice: paragraphs 36-37. On the evidence, that was an inevitable and unimpeachable finding, and it is not challenged.

The Judge addressed the law in respect of the article 8 challenge at paragraphs 39-50, directing himself by reference to Norris v Government of the USA (No.2) [2010] UKSC 9, [2010] 2 AC 487 (‘Norris’), H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338 (‘HH v Italy’) and Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 551 (‘Celinksi’). The Judge noted that he was required to consider the specific facts of the case and “carefully weigh the requested person’s Article 8 rights (and those of his partner and any dependent children) against the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligation” (para 49).

At paragraph 51, the Judge set out the factors in favour of granting extradition as follows:

“(i)

There is a strong and continuing important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations.

(ii)

The seriousness of the criminal conduct in respect of which he has been convicted and sentenced. There remains a sentence of circa 16 months outstanding.

(iii)

The assertion by the Judicial Authority and the finding by this court that the requested person is a fugitive from Justice.”

At paragraph 52, the Judge set out the factors in favour of refusing extradition as follows:

“(i)

The RP says that he arrived in the UK in 2007 [sic] and that he wishes to remain.

(ii)

He adds that, until recently, he had been in employment. He lives in fixed accommodation where he resides with his partner and their son. He says that he has made considerable efforts to turn his life around and has completely cut his ties to the Czech republic. He fears returning to his old ways if extradited.

(iii)

The RP states that he has led a law-abiding life since settling in the UK.

(iv)

He asserts that he is not a classic refugee from justice.”

The Judge then made his assessment of the relevant factors at paragraph 53:

“I find that it will not be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 Rights of the requested person for extradition to be ordered.

My reasons and findings are as follows:

(i)

It is very important for the UK to be seen to be upholding its international extradition obligations. The UK is not to be considered a ‘safe haven’ for those sought by other Convention countries either to stand trial or to serve a prison sentence.

(ii)

In my opinion, the criminal conduct set out in the AW is serious and, in the event of a conviction in the UK for like criminal conduct, a prison sentence may be imposed, particularly in view of the RP’s previous convictions for acts of dishonesty.

(iii)

This court finds that the requested person is a fugitive from justice. The reasons for this finding are set out above.

(iv)

It is appreciated that there will be hardship caused to the RP and to his partner, and the children of the family. However, that of itself is not sufficient to prevent an order for extradition from being made.

(vi)

[sic] I am satisfied that the RP’s partner and their child will, if necessary, be able to move to live with her mother (who lives nearby and who presently cares for the two other children of RP’s partner). It may be that RP’s partner will have to apply to access State benefits to assist her financially.

(vii)

The court also notes that the RP says that the £3,000 security lodged for bail purposes, are his funds and there would appear to be no reason why that could not be returned to him (in the event that he surrenders for surrender as required). Those funds could then be made available to the RP’s partner to assist her financially.

(viii)

The RP’s credibility was tested during his oral testimony. He had no answer when it was pointed out to him that in his proof of evidence he had firmly denied committing the crime in question, whereas in evidence he had openly admitted having been the author of the offence (but that he regarded it as a ‘minor’ crime which would not bother the Czech authorities).

(ix)

He agrees that he is not a man of previous good character and … he acknowledges that he had previously committed a number of thefts which had resulted in him serving circa 3 years imprisonment. He adds that those crimes were committed when he was much younger and was living in a Children’s home (Footnote: ¹) and this court appreciates that he may well have had a difficult upbringing and that he has made efforts to change his life in recent times.

(x)

As this court has found as a fact that the RP is a fugitive from justice, this finding brings paragraph 39 of the decision in Celinski above into consideration. I do not find that there are such strong counter-balancing factors as would render extradition Article 8 disproportionate in this case.

(xi)

I take into account that there may be some Brexit uncertainty for this requested person, were extradition to be ordered. In relation thereto I bear in mind the High Court rulings in Antochi v Germany [2021] EWHC [3092] (Admin) and Pink v Poland [2021] EWHC [1238] (Admin).

(x)

I also take into account, in an Article 8 context, the time that has passed to date since the RP was convicted of having committed the criminal conduct complained of, but I do not find that this period of time tips the balance in the RP’s favour.

(xii)

[sic] I also taken into account, as part of the Article 8 balancing exercise, the fact that the RP has been required to abide by a 4 hour curfew as part of his bail conditions – and that this has been recognised by the UK courts as a restriction on his liberty. However, whether on its own or allied to the other points referred to heretofore, this does not render extradition Article 8 disproportionate.”