AC-2024-LON-002673 - [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)

The Appellant submits that the Judge failed to apply the “best interests of the child test”. He contends that this required the Judge to give the greatest weight to the best interests of the child, as a primary consideration in the balancing exercise. Instead, the greatest weight was given to the public interest in abiding by international extradition obligations.

The Appellant points out that there is no reference to the “best interests of the child” in the Judgment. It would offend the principle of legality to infer from silence that he gave the greatest weight to the best interests of the children. At paragraph 49 the Judge noted that the court was required to “carefully weigh the requested person’s Article 8 rights (and those of his partner and any dependent children) against the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligation”. But when considering as a factor in favour of refusing extradition that the father resides with his partner and son, the Appellant contends that the focus was on the father’s article 8 rights rather than the rights of the children.

The Appellant contends that the Judge wrongly applied a generalised test of “hardship” caused to the Appellant, his partner and the children, rather than considering each child’s best interests. Reference was made to the financial impact, but not to the emotional impact on each child of losing their father or stepfather. As a consequence of the failure to consider the close ties between the Appellant and each child, and the centrality of those ties to the wellbeing of each child, the Appellant submits the relevant factors have been incorrectly weighed.

The Appellant contends that the Judge was required to consider the best interests of each child first and treat that as the starting point. He erred in treating the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations as the starting point.

He submits that in repeatedly describing the public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations as “important” or “very important” the Judge treated this consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of the child, without due consideration of those interests, and thereby erred in law. The Appellant contends that it cannot be inferred from the Judge’s recitation of the evidence that the law has been correctly applied to those facts.

The Appellant contends that if the best interests of the child test had been properly applied, the consequences for his son, and the effect on his stepdaughters, would have led to a different decision. The Appellant submits that given his son’s young age, and the fact that they live together, his extradition will have an exceptionally severe impact on his son. In view of the Appellant’s transformation since coming to the UK, the value of the money and goods stolen, the fact that he was initially given a suspended sentence, and the time he has spent subject to a curfew, this was a borderline case. If the best interests of the children had been properly assessed and weighed, they would have tipped the balance.

The Respondent submits, first, that the Judge made no error: he properly considered the best interests of the children and, second, that in any event this is not a borderline case: the balance falls decisively in favour of extradition.

In relation to the first submission, the Respondent notes that the Judge expressly cited HH v Italy, observing, with respect to article 8 challenges, that in that case the Supreme Court “gave important guidance in relation to the rights of dependent children”. The Respondent contends that it is inconceivable the Judge did not have in mind the key point to be derived from HH v Italy that “in considering article 8 in any case in which the rights of a child are involved, the best interest of the child must be a primary consideration” ([15]). The impact on the children of the Appellant’s extradition, together with the impact on himself and his partner, was the first factor against extradition that the Judge considered in his analysis (at [53(iv)]). It is plain that, against the background of the evidence relating to the children that he had set out, he was treating their interests as a primary consideration. The way in which he expressed his findings on impact was consistent with Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23, [81].