AC-2024-LON-001145 - [2025] EWHC 2075 (Admin)

The final two grounds constitute an appeal against the sanction imposed by the MPTS, which was (as I have said) suspension from the medical register. Under Ground 7, Mr Ojo submitted that the MPTS order on sanction was arbitrary and irrational. The Tribunal ordered that the second appellant be suspended for two months and the first appellant for three months. Mr Ojo submitted that there was no logical basis for the disparity in sanction and no adequate or proper reasoning for these determinations.

Under Ground 8, Mr Ojo contended that the MPTS erred by making a punitive order. The Tribunal determined that conditions of practice were not workable but gave inadequate reasoning for this decision, particularly in circumstances where the IOT had revoked the suspension and replaced it with an order of conditions which had been sufficient to prevent any further complaints.

I am able to deal with these two grounds together. The Tribunal’s decisions in each case expressly state that the sanction for each appellant was separately considered. That was the proper approach to take: it would have been wrong for the Tribunal to treat two different cases as calling for the same sanction. As Mr Dunlop submitted, the sanctions were different because different allegations were proved against each appellant. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the first’s appellant’s misconduct was overall more serious than the misconduct of the second appellant and to reflect that distinction in its sanctions. I have been provided with no real argument on disparity that could lead me to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision in either case.

In determining whether it was appropriate to suspend the appellants, the Tribunal had regard to the relevant GMC guidance which stated:

“91.

Suspension has a deterrent effect and can be used to send out a signal to the doctor, the profession and public about what is regarded as behaviour unbefitting a registered doctor. Suspension from the medical register also has a punitive effect, in that it prevents the doctor from practising (and therefore from earning a living as a doctor) during the suspension, although this is not its intention.

92.

Suspension will be an appropriate response to misconduct that is so serious that action must be taken to protect members of the public and maintain public confidence in the profession. A period of suspension will be appropriate for conduct that is serious but falls short of being fundamentally incompatible with continued registration (ie for which erasure is more likely to be the appropriate sanction because the tribunal considers that the doctor should not practise again either for public safety reasons or to protect the reputation of the profession)…”

There can be no realistic room for doubt that the misconduct of both of these doctors was “so serious that action must be taken to protect members of the public and maintain public confidence in the profession.” I can express the seriousness of what they did no better than the specialist FTT which considered (at para 40 of its judgment) the need for an urgent cancellation order:

“It is important to recognise that an urgent cancellation order lies at the very top of the hierarchy of possible enforcement action that can be taken under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. An urgent cancellation order can only be made if it appears that serious risk of harm to life, health or well-being exists” (emphasis added).

In such circumstances, suspension rather than erasure may be considered generous. There are certainly no grounds for this court to interfere. Grounds 7 and 8 fail.