AC-2024-LON-001145 - [2025] EWHC 2075 (Admin)

Fecha: 04-Ago-2025

Mrs Justice Farbey DBE

Mrs Justice Farbey DBE:

Introduction

The appellants are GPs who practiced in a partnership, with other GPs, at the Staunton Group Practice (“the Practice”) situated in the Morum House Medical Centre in Bounds Green, London (“the Medical Centre”). By an Appellant’s Notice dated 5 April 2024, they appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 (“the Act”) against various decisions of a tribunal of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (“the MPTS” or “the Tribunal”) that led to each of them being suspended from the Medical Register.

The proceedings before the Tribunal concerned the appellants’ fitness to practise as doctors. The Tribunal made numerous findings against each appellant and concluded that their fitness to practise was impaired by reason of misconduct.

The findings arose from events that took place as long ago as November 2018. The main charge brought by the GMC was that the appellants had, over the course of a number of days, obstructed a third party supplier from taking over responsibility for GP services at the Medical Centre. The transfer of responsibility was the result of a “caretaker” arrangement made by NHS England (“NHSE”). Under that arrangement, an organisation called Federated4Health was assigned to take over and run GP services after the Practice had its registration with the Care Quality Commission (“CQC”) suspended. The MPTS found (among other things) that the appellants had each refused to permit Federated4Health to have unfettered access to the Medical Centre and had themselves delivered patient services in place of Federated4Health.

Although there are two appellants, there is only one appeal. The grounds of appeal are advanced on behalf of both appellants by Mr Oluwaseyi Ojo. There are eight grounds. They fall under three headings.

Grounds 1-5: Race discrimination: Under the first heading, it is submitted that the charges brought against the appellants by the GMC amounted to unjustified difference in treatment on grounds of race. The charges therefore constituted unlawful direct discrimination contrary to section 53 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”). Given that the charges were the product of discrimination on grounds of race, the MPTS was wrong and misdirected itself in law by failing to stay the charges as an abuse of process. The target of this aspect of the appeal is the Tribunal’s ruling on abuse of process dated 18 July 2024 (“the abuse of process decision”).

ii.

Grounds 6-7: Factual findings: Under the second heading, it is submitted that the Tribunal made inconsistent findings of fact and failed to give adequate reasons for its findings of fact. The targets of this aspect of the appeal are the Tribunal’s determinations of the facts dated 7 November 2023 in the case of the first appellant and 8 November 2023 in the case of the second appellant.

iii.

Ground 8: Sanctions: Under the third heading, it is submitted that the suspension orders imposed on each appellant were arbitrary, irrational and inadequately reasoned. The appropriate sanction in each case would have been the imposition of conditions of practice. The targets of this aspect of the appeal are the Tribunal’s determinations on sanction which are in the case of both appellants dated 8 March 2024.

The appellants seek an order allowing the appeal. Despite their submission that the proceedings below should have been stayed as an abuse of process, they seek an order remitting the case to a freshly constituted tribunal to determine the allegations against them.

On behalf of the General Medical Council (“GMC”), Mr Rory Dunlop KC (who did not appear below) resists the appeal on all grounds. The GMC has filed a respondent’s notice asking the court to uphold the first appellant’s suspension order on one additional ground which failed below, namely that the MPTS ought to have found that the first appellant gave dishonest and not merely unreliable evidence in proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) (“the FTT”). Mr Dunlop accepted before me that there was no need for the court to deal with this additional ground. I do not propose to say more about it.