AC-2024-LON-001762 - [2025] EWHC 2293 (Admin)

Fecha: 11-Sep-2025

Discussion

199.

I agree largely agree with Mr Evans’ analysis as summarised at [190(i)-(vii)] above.

Majera confirms that it is a well-established principle of our constitutional law that a court order has to be obeyed unless and until it has been set aside or varied by the court, or overruled by legislation, regardless of whether the order was valid or invalid, regular or irregular, and whether made by a court of unlimited or limited jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule lies in the rule of law and the basic principle that court orders should not be ignored. It therefore follows that neither the executive nor any other body or person may lawfully act in a manner which is inconsistent with an order of a judge which is considered to be defective without first applying for, and obtaining, the variation or setting aside of the order.

ii)

In the present case the Magistrates’ Court had made an order and the SSHD was required to proceed on the basis that that order was in effect until such time as it was set aside or varied. At the time of the Decision, the Warrant had therefore been “disposed of” within the meaning of section 213(2)(a) of the 2003 Act for the reasons which Mr Evans gives, and therefore for the purposes of section 179(2). It therefore would not have made sense for the Minister to order that the Request be deferred until the Warrant had been “disposed of”.

iii)

N3 is not an analogous case because it did not concern the effect of quashing a court order. As the Supreme Court made clear in Majera, the rule which their Lordships identified applies specifically to court orders rather than administrative decisions and acts, which are subject to different principles. N3 concerned orders under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 depriving the claimants of British citizenship. The orders had been made by the SSHD rather than a court. One of the issues before the Supreme Court was as to the effect of a subsequent decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) to allow an appeal against the SSHD’s decision on the grounds that it rendered the claimants “stateless”. The fact that the Supreme Court held that the decision of the SSHD had no effect for the purpose of determining the status of the claimants between the decisions of the SSHD and the SIAC is of no assistance in the present case.

iv)

More fundamentally N3, and R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340 and A1 Properties (Sunderland) Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Co Ltd [2024] UKSC 27, [2024] 3 WLR 601, to which their Lordships referred as providing the basis for their analysis in N3, were about the legal effect of a failure to comply with a condition for the exercise of a power conferred by statute (see [88] of N3). That is not the issue here. In the present case District Judge Snow applied the relevant provisions of the 2003 Act correctly on the information available to him at the time, rather than failing to comply with a condition precedent to the exercise of his power to make an extradition order.

Similarly, I do not accept that Mr Evans’ interpretation is somehow contrary to the aims, the scheme or the terms of the 2003 Act. Rather, it is based on what the statute intended on the facts as they were understood and/or were at the relevant times. The District Judge was not informed of the Request and applied the statute correctly in these circumstances. Under the terms of the statute, orders under sections 179(2)(a) and (c) were not open to the SSHD as at 14 March 2024.

vi)

I therefore do not accept that, as a matter of construction of the 2003 Act or otherwise, the effect of Choudhury J’s quashing order is that this court should proceed as if the order of District Judge Snow was never made.

200.

Where I part company from Mr Evans and Ms Cumberland, however, is that I do not accept that the only option available to the SSHD as at 14 March 2024 was to make an order under section 179(2)(b). That was not the view of the person who drafted the Submission and there is no evidence that it was the view of the Minister: there is no witness statement from him and all of the evidence is to contrary effect. Nor, on the evidence, was the Decision made pursuant to section 179(2)(b). It was made pursuant to section 179(2)(a) and the exercise was conducted on the basis that he should make a choice between the Request and the Warrant and had full discretion in this regard, albeit the recommendation was to give precedence to the former.

201.

There is also no evidence as to what the Minister would have done if the Submission had presented the position accurately. In relation to Ground 1, he was not told that he should consider representations. As I have found under Ground 2, the factual picture which was presented to him was materially inaccurate in favour of giving precedence to the Request. In relation to Ground 3, the matter was also presented to the Minister on the basis that the personal interests of the Claimant were irrelevant, when they were relevant. He was also told that there was a 14 March 2024 deadline for a decision when in fact District Judge Snow had ordered that the Claimant should not be extradited until the section 179 decision had been taken. And he was told, in effect, that the error which became the subject of Claim 2 could not be corrected when in fact an application could be made to the Administrative Court for the order of District Judge Snow to be quashed.

202.

If the Submission had presented the position accurately it would have been open to the Minister to invite representations but postpone making the decision until the error of District Judge Snow had been corrected, or to invite representations and consider the matter on the merits on a provisional basis with a view to taking steps to quash the order for extradition to Portugal if the Minister was minded to defer the Request. Certainly, it seems unlikely that if the facts had been presented accurately, the Minister had been told that he would normally (i.e. absent District Judge Snow’s error) be required, in fairness, to hear representations and that he had an indefinite amount of time to make his decision, he would nevertheless have decided to take advantage of the error which had been made, press on and then defend this approach on the basis of a decision of the District Judge which was regarded as erroneous and, it was considered, ought to be quashed for this reason.

203.

All of this being so, I do not accept that the Claim is academic because there was only one decision open to the SSHD as at 14 March 2024. Nor do I accept that relief should be refused for this reason.