AC-2024-LON-001762 - [2025] EWHC 2293 (Admin)

Fecha: 11-Sep-2025

The arguments of the parties

160.

Mr Cooper alleged that, even in considering the factors in section 179(3) alone, the Minister failed to take into account the following relevant considerations.

First, in assessing the relative seriousness of the offending which was the subject of the Request and the Warrant, and on the basis that the SSHD accepted that the allegations/offending were “identical” the SSHD failed to take into account the evidence set out in the documents themselves (“factor 1”).

ii)

Second, in relation to where the offending took place, the SSHD failed to take into account that the vast majority of the Claimant’s offending took place when he was in Portugal. Nor did the Minister take into account the large sums received into the Claimant’s account in Portugal (€650,682) and the fact that these exceeded the sums referred to in the Request as representing the proceeds of the offending alleged (USD 215,571) (“factor 2”).

iii)

Third, the Minister failed to consider factors arising from the fact that the Claimant is of Portuguese nationality including his family support in Portugal which was highly relevant to his suicide risk (“factor 3”).

iv)

Fourth, in relation to the victims of the alleged offending, the Minister failed to take into account the evidence to the contrary in approaching the matter on the basis that all of the victims were based on the USA. He also appears to have given determinative weight to this view rather than weighing it against other considerations (“factor 4”).

Fifth, referring to [12(b)] of the GLD’s pre action protocol response, Mr Cooper criticised the statement (also at [10] of Annex B to the Submission) that “if (sic) prosecution were to proceed in Portugal, the transmission of evidence and attendance of witnesses could potentially cause issues, thereby vitiating the proper and fair administration of justice” which he said was unevidenced and unjustified. He referred to Love v The Government of the United States of America [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin); [2018] 1 WLR 2889 at [36(d)] and Scott v The Government of the United States of America [2018] EWHC 2021 (Admin); [2019] 1 WLR 774 at [48]-[49] where, he said, arguments of this nature in relation to forum had been accorded little weight (“factor 5”).

161.

Mr Cooper also criticised the Minister’s failure to take into account any considerations over and above the statutory criteria including:

The suicide risk and risk of psychiatric harm to the Claimant of extradition to the USA and the family support available to him in Portugal (“factor 6”);

ii)

The SSHD’s obligations to the Claimant as a potential victim of modern slavery and his rights under the ECAT as a result of the reasonable grounds decision of 1 September 2023 and, in particular, his right under section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 not to be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom during the “recovery period” of 30 days from the reasonable grounds decision or the conclusive grounds decision, whichever is the later. It was a material consideration that, at the time of the Decision, the statutory recovery period had not yet expired given that the conclusive grounds decision was made on 22 April 2024 (“factor 7”).

iii)

The fact that Portugal is a signatory to the ECAT and the ECHR and the potential for cooperation with the Portuguese authorities in relation to the investigation of the grooming of the Claimant which led to his offending. The United Kingdom and Portugal had obligations to investigate modern slavery under Article 32 ECAT and Article 4 ECHR but the USA did not (“factor 8”).

162.

Ms Cumberland’s position was essentially that the SSHD had taken into account the considerations which were required to be considered and there had not been any irrational failure to take relevant matters into account or consideration of irrelevant matters. There was no obligation to consider matters over and above the factors required by section 179(3) and the personal rights/interests referred to by the Claimant were a matter for the courts, in the context of a particular extradition claim, rather than the SSHD, as she submitted in relation to Ground 1. The same was true of the Claimant’s arguments based on his status as a victim of modern slavery and, in any event, the findings of a junior civil servant cannot be relied on as expert evidence in a criminal trial and may in any event be too brief to deserve weight: see e.g. Koceku v Albania [2024] EWHC 1028 (Admin) at [29] and [43]. In any event, this consideration would not have made any difference to the Decision as section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2002 is concerned with immigration removal and not extradition. In relation to cooperation in investigating the grooming of the Claimant, it is not clear why this could not be possible in the event of his extradition to the USA.