CL-2018-000297, CL-2018-000404, CL-2018-000590, - [2025] EWHC 2364 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2018-000297, CL-2018-000404, CL-2018-000590, - [2025] EWHC 2364 (Comm)

Fecha: 02-Oct-2025

A.5 The Main Trial

A.5 The Main Trial

29.

Five Claims were consolidated: CL-2018-000297 (the ‘First Claim’, with 70 defendants); CL-2018-000404 (the ‘Second Claim’, with 25 defendants); CL-2018-000590 (the ‘Third Claim’, with 8 defendants); CL-2019-000487 (the ‘Fourth Claim’, with 9 defendants); and CL-2020-000369 (the ‘Fifth Claim’, with 7 defendants). Allowing for overlap (some defendants were named on more than one Claim Form), in total 106 defendants were named (in error, I said 114 in my Revenue Rule judgment, referred to in paragraph 32(i) below).

30.

At the date of this judgment, there are, on the defendants’ side of the litigation: 4 legal teams representing between them 30 defendants (subject to the point mentioned in paragraph 38 below); 14 individuals litigating in person; a limited liability partnership (Lindisfarne) represented at trial, with my permission, by its partners; 10 unrepresented corporate defendants; and 1 corporate defendant (Syntax) against whom judgment was entered in default, for an amount to be determined. They are the 56 defendants SKAT’s pleaded claims against whom fall to be determined, and are now determined, by this judgment (the ‘trial defendants’), subject again to the point in paragraph 38 below. I note for completeness that the default judgment entered against Syntax with which I am concerned was entered against it as the 22nd defendant to the Second Claim. Syntax was also named as the 68th defendant in the First Claim. That is one of the duplications referred to in the previous paragraph. The First Claim stands stayed against Syntax.

31.

The remaining 50 defendants originally in these proceedings, claims against whom are not now before the court for judgment, were:

(i)

3 corporate defendants that no longer exist (2 dissolved, 1 liquidated);

(ii)

1 corporate defendant never served, such that claims against it lapsed (Roxy Ventures LLC Solo 401K Plan);

(iii)

7 defendants (2 individuals, 5 corporate entities) against whom the proceedings were discontinued by SKAT (Janice Allgrove, Robyn Llewellyn, Trixor Holdings One Ltd, Europa LLP Executive Pension Scheme, Khajuraho Equity Trading Sarl, SBD TT Ltd (in liquidation), and IPIS UK (Battersea London 1) Ltd (in liquidation));

(iv)

MCML (see paragraph 26 above);

(v)

2 corporate defendants now indirectly ultimately owned by Sanjay Shah, Polaris Capital Ltd and Polaris Capital (One) Ltd, against whom, under an order I made on Day 63 of the trial, the proceedings are stayed until after this judgment is handed down;

(vi)

36 defendants (7 individuals, 29 corporate entities) in respect of whom these proceedings were terminated or stayed by agreement between SKAT and those defendants, including 2 corporate defendants against whom judgment as to liability was entered in default early in the proceedings with stays relating to them being agreed much later, during the course of the trial.

32.

The first main CMC in these proceedings was in January 2020, before which I was appointed as designated judge by Teare J. At a further CMC in July 2020, I gave a case management ruling, [2020] EWHC 2022 (Comm), explaining my decision to direct three trials:

(i)

A ‘Revenue Rule Trial’ to decide whether SKAT’s claims offended against what was then Dicey Rule 3, and is now Dicey Rule 20, viz. the rule of English law that:

English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action:

(1)

for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign State; or

(2)

founded upon an act of state.”

(Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 16th Ed., Rule 20 at 8R-001.)

I held that SKAT’s claims did offend against that Rule, [2021] EWHC 974 (Comm). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by SKAT, save in respect of its claims against MCML, [2022] EWCA Civ 234, and that outcome was upheld in the Supreme Court, [2023] UKSC 40.

(ii)

A ‘Validity Trial’ to decide aspects of SKAT’s allegation that the tax refund claims impugned in the proceedings were not valid claims under Danish tax law. I heard that trial in Hilary Term 2023. SKAT (Validity Issues) [2023] EWHC 590 (Comm) followed. I gave the judgment that short title because it decided identified foundational issues of Danish tax law and did not decide, in terms, the validity or invalidity of any individual tax refund claim. That said, in fact it follows from the decisions I made upon those issues that each of the 4,170 tax refund claims impugned in these proceedings was an invalid claim that SKAT was not liable to pay. I explain that conclusion in paragraphs 43 to 97 below.

(iii)

The Main Trial, upon which this is now the judgment, to determine all remaining issues in all the claims SKAT made in these proceedings. The Main Trial was originally fixed to commence in January 2023 and to run until Easter 2024. It was re-fixed, after the Court of Appeal decision on the Revenue Rule, to commence immediately after Easter 2024. A Main Trial timetable was developed for openings and evidence to occupy the Easter, Trinity and Michaelmas Terms 2024, including reading time, respite breaks and possible overrun, with closing argument to follow in the second half of Hilary Term 2025, after an exchange of written closing submissions.

33.

The Main Trial thus occupied 138 days over 33 weeks between 9 April 2024 and 10 April 2025. It ran generally as scheduled, sitting for 108 days between 15 April 2024 (Day 1) and 10 April 2025 (Day 108), with 30 reading days spread across the trial timetable, plus breaks for court vacations and for the parties to prepare closing argument after the completion of the evidence on (in the event) 2 December 2024 (Day 76). Given the number of parties to whom time needed to be allocated for argument and the number of points to be addressed, oral closing argument took 32 days, between 24 February 2025 (Day 77) and 10 April 2025 (Day 108), supported by written closing materials running to c.5,350 pages.

34.

I am very grateful to all who participated in the preparation and conduct of the trial, helping me to plan its schedule in some detail and to keep substantially to that schedule when the time came. At the risk of saying something that is invidious by omission, I wish to record here my particular thanks for three types of contribution:

(i)

Firstly, I think it right to acknowledge specially the helpful contribution to the effectiveness of the presentation of the case at trial made by oral advocacy from junior counsel for SKAT, the Shah Ds and the DWF Ds. They were the only legally represented parties appearing by more than one advocate, so they were the only parties with decisions to make about how to share the key tasks of presenting the case orally at trial. In particular, Messrs Rabinowitz KC, Graham KC and Goldsmith KC, for SKAT, not only shared between themselves the large burden of leading the case in a way that was logical, efficient and helpful, but also led by example in ensuring that responsibility for oral advocacy was also shared substantially with their (extensive) team of juniors; and the extent to which Ms Freeman and Ms McCann led for the Shah Ds on parts of the case and with some of the witnesses was very welcome. In my view, this trial was a good example proving what is said in paragraph 2 of the Practice Guidance (Junior Advocacy) of 8 July 2025 issued jointly by Henshaw J and HHJ Pelling KC, for the Commercial Court and the London Circuit Commercial Court.

(ii)

Secondly, I am grateful to Pinsent Masons for showing in numerous ways throughout the proceedings, and acting upon, a keen awareness that they had an important role, given the size and complexity of the case and the number of defendants, especially (as it became) the number of unrepresented defendants, in coordination and communication, with the other parties and with the court, and on occasion, at my request, effectively on behalf of the court. The way they fulfilled that role was a significant part of enabling the litigation to proceed at all, and assisted the court in making sure that all parties who wished to be heard had their fair and sufficient opportunity. In that role, it was essential that Pinsent Masons act independently as officers of the court, separately from acting as SKAT’s solicitors pursuing their client’s cause. I respectfully consider that they carried out that additional role to a high standard.

(iii)

Thirdly, my particular thanks on behalf of all trial participants go to Opus2 International Ltd, whose services the parties used for the litigation here. Opus2 thus hosted the case digitally for 5½ years or so on a shared, secure workspace, and provided magnificent support for the Main Trial hearing (and also for almost all if not all of the other hearings in the case, including the two preliminary issue trials). For the Main Trial, that included Opus2 organising and hosting remote access for those authorised to attend remotely, for which they worked closely and constructively with my Clerk. As I said in court when thanking Opus2 for all that assistance: my instinct is that we are all good enough at what we do in the Commercial Court, that is the court itself, legal practitioners in the court, and our litigants, that without the kind of digital service that Opus2 (and no doubt other providers too) can now offer, somehow we would have found a way to make the trial work; but at the same time, the service from Opus2 was so good and so helpful that I am not at all sure I could in fact identify how, really, we could have managed without it, or something like it.

35.

For the purpose of reaching my decisions and preparing this judgment, I have reviewed and considered the evidence adduced at trial and all the arguments put forward by the parties. It is neither necessary nor realistic for me to set out and deal individually with every point taken, and I have not attempted to do so. Nor do I descend in this judgment to anything like the level of detail the parties gave me in their written submissions. That level of detail contributed to the very great length of some of those submissions, which will have involved huge effort on the part of the limited number of well-resourced legal teams in the case. It was not as helpful as would have been a focused written presentation of the important findings of fact contended for, identifying for each the case pleaded, and then the evidence said to establish it and/or the facts, inherent probabilities or other matters from which it was said that it should be inferred. A key task of litigation advocacy is to help the court to see the wood said to be constituted by the trees, which is not usually done by devoting hundreds of pages to describing in close detail the leaves or bark patterns of individual saplings. With hindsight, I regret that I was persuaded by the difficulty of identifying how many pages should suffice not to impose page limits on the written closing submissions.

36.

As I described the decision-making process in Kyla Shipping Co Ltd et al v Freight Trading Ltd et al [2022] EWHC 1625 (Comm) at [24], so also here, “My conclusions as to the facts follow from a consideration of all the evidence in the round, and all the parties’ submissions on the evidence, even if I do not mention or summarise all of that evidence or all of those submissions. It is rarely possible to do full justice to the holistic, iterative, self-critical and cross-checking nature of the process of assessing a case on the evidence, in an essentially ‘linear’ written judgment. Thus, for example, my assessment of the factual witnesses was informed by the plausibility of their evidence, and its consistency or inconsistency with the documentary record, as well as by the ability “which cross-examination afford[ed] to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge [the witnesses’] personality, motivations and working practices” (per Leggatt J, as he was then, in Gestmin SGPS S.A. v (1) Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & (2) Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) at [22]); but at the same time, my final sense of the plausibility of rival accounts on disputed matters, bearing in mind what is or is not in the documentary record, was informed by the personalities involved (and their motivations and working practices), the most important of which I had an opportunity to gauge through the trial process.