CL-2018-000297, CL-2018-000404, CL-2018-000590, - [2025] EWHC 2364 (Comm)

Fecha: 02-Oct-2025

A.6 Defendants and Claims

37.

Appendix 1 to this judgment lists the trial defendants. It identifies where each is to be found on one or more of the five consolidated Claim Forms, and it defines the terms I use to refer to them in this judgment. Taking Sanjay Shah, for example: he is identified in Appendix 1 as the 34^th defendant to the First Claim; the ‘Sanjay Shah Defendants’ or ‘SSDs’ are then identified as Sanjay Shah himself plus some 23 corporate entities; and the ‘Shah Defendants’ or ‘Shah Ds’ are then the SSDs plus Sanjay Shah’s wife, Usha Shah, the 36^th defendant to the First Claim.

38.

Having mentioned the SSDs, it is convenient to explain now the point referred to in paragraph 30 above. The SSDs include nine companies that were struck off in their respective places of incorporation prior to the Main Trial, six of which remain struck off at the date of this judgment, all as noted in Appendix 1. The title page to this judgment says that the Shah Ds (which I have defined to include all of the SSDs) were represented by Mr Jones KC and his juniors, instructed by Meaby & Co. Strictly, that is not true for the corporate SSDs that still stand struck off, and it was not true during the Main Trial for those that were struck off at the time but have now been restored to the register (Colbrook, Ganymede and T&S).

39.

What can or should happen to SKAT’s claims against any of the SSDs that still stand struck off, if restored to a register after the date of this judgment, is not something I have been asked to consider or could properly consider until the restored company had been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and I was told that, as things stand, there is no plan to seek to have any of those companies restored to its respective register.

40.

As for Colbrook, Ganymede and T&S, after those companies were restored to the register in the Cayman Islands, Meaby & Co confirmed to the court in writing that they, and counsel instructed by them, now represent the companies. By that letter, on behalf of those companies and with the agreement of Pinsent Masons on behalf of SKAT, Meaby & Co confirmed that the companies and SKAT jointly wished the Main Trial as conducted between April 2024 and April 2025 to be treated as the trial of SKAT’s claims against the companies, even though they stood struck out at the time. Meaby & Co proposed, and I am content, that my recording all of that now in this judgment should be sufficient for the result under this judgment to be effective as between SKAT and each of Colbrook, Ganymede and T&S, and for any order made upon this judgment, so far as material, to determine SKAT’s claims against each of those companies.

41.

Appendix 2 to this judgment identifies in very summary form the causes of action pursued by SKAT at trial and maintained in closing argument against the various trial defendants (other than Syntax). All those defendants had a proper opportunity to plead a case for, call evidence at, and otherwise participate generally in the Main Trial (subject to paragraph 38 above). The heading of this judgment identifies which trial defendants in fact participated. I was and remain satisfied that the case management of the litigation provided all defendants with a fair opportunity to participate, even if in some cases their financial or other circumstances were not ideal for full participation. I am satisfied that it is just for the court now to proceed, on the basis of the Main Trial as completed on 10 April 2025, to determine all live claims pursued by SKAT, even where that means for some trial defendants having proceeded in their absence, in their presence but without hearing from them, or where they were unrepresented but would have preferred to have had legal representation.

42.

Pursuant to case management directions concerning how any case was to be raised to the effect that any of SKAT’s claims is not governed by or should not be determined under English law, all of SKAT’s claims fall to be determined under English law, albeit, of course, by reference to Danish tax law as it governs the question whether the tax refund claims impugned by SKAT were claims that SKAT was not obliged to pay. That had become the case by the time of oral opening remarks at trial except for SKAT’s claims against Mr Fletcher, the Jain Ds and the Godson Ds, who at that stage maintained a pleaded case that SKAT’s claims against them were governed by and should be determined under Danish law. As to that:

(i)

SKAT’s position was always that its claims pursued here were governed by English law and should be determined on the basis of English law;

(ii)

from SKAT’s perspective, therefore, a plea that Danish law should be applied to one or more of its pleaded claims amounted, in effect, to a pleaded defence if the claim in question would succeed if judged under English law;

(iii)

SKAT confirmed at trial that therefore it pursued Danish law claims against Mr Fletcher, the Jain Ds, and the Godson Ds, only on a strictly alternative basis, if and to the extent that any of their respective pleas succeeded to the effect that Danish law applied;

(iv)

at the same time, SKAT submitted that where the question of governing law was in issue, then that question was logically the prior question when judging the relevant claim, and that may be the correct analysis;

(v)

when the procedural position and its consequences were explored at trial, Mr Fletcher, the Godson Ds, and the Jain Ds, abandoned and withdrew their respective pleas that Danish law applied, after most of the factual witnesses had given their evidence and before any expert evidence had been called;

(vi)

as a result, the claims against them now also fall to be determined under English law.