CA-2025-001983 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1311

This appeal concerns an organisation known as Palestine Action. By an Order made on 4 July 2025 (“the Order”), which took effect on 5 July 2025, the appellant, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, added Palestine Action to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (“Schedule 2”) (“the Act”). That had the consequences that various acts, such as belonging to, or supporting, Palestine Action would involve the commission of a criminal offence.

Prior to the making of the Order, Ms Ammori, one of the founders of Palestine Action, issued a claim for judicial review of the decision to add Palestine Action to the list in Schedule 2. She sought permission to apply for judicial review on eight grounds. That application was considered by Chamberlain J. (“the Judge”) at an oral hearing on 25 July 2025.

In his written judgment handed down on 30 July 2025, the Judge ruled, as a preliminary issue, that an application to the Secretary of State to remove Palestine Action from the list in Schedule 2 (referred to as “deproscription”), together with the right of appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (“POAC”) against a refusal of the application, was not an adequate alternative remedy to a claim for judicial review of the initial decision to add Palestine Action to the list in Schedule 2. He held that the case could therefore proceed by way of a claim for judicial review in the Administrative Court. He granted permission to apply for judicial review on two grounds, but refused permission on six other grounds (only four of which are material for present purposes).

The Secretary of State appeals, with permission, against the decision on the preliminary ruling that an application to deproscribe an organisation, coupled with a right of appeal to POAC, was not an adequate alternative remedy to a claim for judicial review. This appeal, therefore, concerns solely the question of whether the claim should be allowed to proceed by way of judicial review in the Administrative Court. It has nothing to do with the substantive merits of the claim.

In essence, the Secretary of State submitted that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and should only be used where an adequate or suitable alternative remedy was not available. She submitted that Parliament had established the procedure of applying for deproscription, with a further right of appeal, as a means of challenging the continued proscription of an organisation. She submitted that where Parliament had established a particular appeal route which was intended for use in a category of cases, that appeal procedure ordinarily was an adequate alternative remedy for dealing with those cases. Further, the Secretary of State submitted that the Judge was wrong in deciding that there were exceptional circumstances which meant that an appeal to POAC was not an adequate remedy in this case. In particular, it was submitted that the Judge erred (1) in relying on the fact that judicial review would be more expeditious than an appeal to POAC, (2) in his assessment of the detriment to Ms Ammori and others if an appeal rather than judicial review had to be pursued, (3) in his analysis of the implications for those charged with criminal offences, (4) in his consideration of the differences between POAC and the Administrative Court considering a claim for judicial review, and (5) in rejecting the submission that the availability of judicial review would render the deproscription and appeal route otiose. It was submitted that the Judge had also erred in not following the decision of Richards J. in R (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 644 (Admin).

Separately, Ms Ammori seeks permission to appeal against the decision of the Judge to refuse permission to apply for judicial review on grounds 1, 5, 6 and 7 of the claim. She does so by means of a Respondent’s Notice filed on 3 September 2025. That raises the question of whether the application for permission was made out of time, as it was not made within seven days of the decision of the Judge refusing permission to apply for judicial review (as contemplated by CPR 52.8). Prior to the hearing before us, Ms Ammori had not applied for an extension of time, on the basis that she considered that none was needed. However, at the hearing, she indicated that she would wish to seek an extension of time if one were needed. The Court gave directions at the hearing on 25 September 2025 fixing a timetable for such an application to be made. In accordance with that timetable, Ms Ammori applied for an extension of time on 30 September 2025, that application being supported by a witness statement of Ms Sally Middleton dated 29 September 2025. The Secretary of State responded by written submissions dated 3 October 2025. Ms Ammori replied by written submissions dated 6 October 2025.

For completeness, we note that the Special Advocates filed a note shortly before the hearing which was to be treated as closed material. Having read the note, we did not consider that the note needed to be treated as closed material and could be disclosed to all the parties. Following the hearing, the Secretary of State confirmed that the note could (with minor amendments) be disclosed to the parties as open material. The note was then provided to all parties to enable them to comment.