Case No. ZC19D00073

McCartney [2008] EWHC 401 (Fam) ) . In other cases where the parties are in the public eye, but the details of the dispute are not in the public domain, the court may authorise publication of the fact that they are engaged in litigation but restrain publication of detailed information relating to the proceedings (for example, Appleton v Gallagher [2015] EWHC 2689 (Fam) ) . (9) Although in most cases, confidentiality can be protected by publishing judgments in an anonymised and redacted form, there are some rare cases where the factual matrix is unique or so unusual that confidentiality can only be protected by withholding the judgment from publication altogether. One example is the judgment in the so-called "Scottish case" delivered by Mostyn J which has never been published but was subsequently cited by the same judge in WM v HM (Financial Remedies: Sharing Principle: Special Contributions) [2017] EWFC 25 . As Mostyn J explained in the latter case at para 110, "I have not given leave for that decision to be reported as the case is incapable of camouflage and were its details to be reported there may be adverse economic consequences." (10) The principles set out above are unaffected by the change in the rules incorporated in FPR r.27(11)(2)(f) and Practice Direction 27B, under which duly accredited representatives of news gathering and reporting organisations are permitted to attend hearings in the family court unless the judge orders otherwise. I respectfully agree with the observations made by Mostyn J in Appleton v Gallagher , supra, at paras 12 to 14, DL v SL, supra, para 1, and again in L v L [2015] in EWHC 2621 (Fam) [2016] 1 WLR 1259 at para 1 that, whilst accredited representatives of the press may be present at the hearing, they are not permitted to report confidential and private information disclosed into the proceedings. It is fair to say, however, that there is some disagreement amongst judges and practitioners on this issue, and as a result the courts are not infrequently invited by the parties to financial remedy proceedings to make a reporting restrictions order.” 16.In financial remedy proceedings the starting point is one of privacy. This arises from a number of considerations including the fact that parties are obliged by rules of court to give full and frank disclosure of all relevant matters. But, further, the breakdown of a relationship and its consequences are intensely personal matters. For the public to be admitted, whether by attendance at a hearing or being able to read about it, would add a layer of pain and embarrassment which is damaging both to the parties and to their wider families. There is no corresponding public benefit. 17.On the other hand, what goes on in family courts is a proper matter of public concern. Open justice is part of the DNA of our constitution. There is a proper public interest in what goes on in the courtroom. 18.These tensions are normally resolved by the publication of anonymised judgments so that although the identity of the party is not revealed, the basis upon which the court has acted is fully visible to anyone interested. 19.One of the curiosities of our legal system is that cases conducted in the Court of Appeal are almost invariably held in public and fully reported with identities (save for anonymisation in children cases) when at first instance the cases have been heard in private. Although the media rely on the argument that if this case had been heard in the Court of Appeal no question of anonymisation would arise, I do not regard that as a relevant consideration. Parties who appear in the Court of Appeal know that their cases will be heard in public. Parties who appear in the Family Court know and expect their cases to be heard in private. 20.In rare cases the conduct of a litigant disentitles him or her from protection against publicity. The leading authority in this area remains Lykiardopulo v Lykiardopulo [2010] EWCA Civ 1315. That was a case in which the judge had found that members of a very wealthy Greek shipping family had conspired to manufacture for the purposes of the divorce financial hearing documents concerning H’s assets. It was a case of forgery and “plain perjury” where there had been a “conspiracy within the family to protect the family business which resulted in the presentation to the court of forged and backdated documents”. It was an extreme case involving an attempted perversion of justice. 21.The judge in that case (Baron J) had ordered publication of the judgment in an anonymised form. What emerged “went beyond anonymisation and involved the creation of a work of fiction”. The Court of Appeal held that the husband’s conduct had deprived him of the right to privacy and directed the publication of the judgment with correct identification. 22.The judgment of Thorpe LJ identifies the various alternatives open to the court when considering publication: i) Publication of a judgment in full; ii) A direction that there shall be no publication; iii) Publication with anonymisation; iv) Publication with redaction; v) Publication of a summary of the judgment. 23.In the occasional high-profile case anonymisation or redaction simply cannot protect the confidentiality of the parties. Thorpe LJ quoted the example of McCartney v Mills