FT/EA/2024/0427 - [2025] UKFTT 01126 (GRC)

Given the significant degree of overlap, we have considered the public interest balance in relation to section 31(1)(a) and (e) of FOIA together. However, we have not aggregated the public interest in this case as, for the reasons outlined below, we are satisfied that the public interest in maintaining either exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

We note that it is not the role of the Tribunal to assess the appropriateness or legality of the turnaround tactics. However, we accept that there is a strong public interest in transparency in relation to immigration enforcement and border control activities – and in particular in relation to turnaround tactics which, although now withdrawn, were and remain controversial.

That strong public interest is lessened to an extent in that pushback was not, at the relevant time, a current operational tactic, and that there has already been widespread reporting about the nature of the authorised operational tactics following the judicial review challenge. In addition, we note that the request is in relation to training material, and so this may limit the public interest to a degree in that any disclosure would be confined to details of how a withdrawn policy may be implemented.

Notwithstanding the above, we remain satisfied that there is a strong public interest in disclosure of the information.

We accept that there is a very strong and inherent public interest in ensuring the effective prevention and detection of crime and in preventing the undermining of immigration controls. There is also a strong public interest in not reducing the deterrent effect of tactics that are used by law enforcement.

We note the evidence of Daniel Tobias Whale that:

“The Home Office does not, as a matter of policy, disclose detailed information about Border Force resources, capabilities or operational methods for the very good reason that such information would be invaluable to individuals or more importantly, OCGs in identifying any strengths or weaknesses and building up a picture of operational priorities, activities and areas of highest risk. This includes not only criminal groups operating in the context of MVs, but more broadly criminal groups seeking to exploit use of the Channel for criminal purposes”.

We accept that there is a public interest in withholding information that would benefit organised crime groups in the ways that are outlined above.

We do also accept that, indirectly, disclosure of such tactics may increase the risk of harm to the occupants of migrant vessels or of those seeking to assist a migrant vessel in difficulty at sea, because of the risk that organised crime groups may adopt tactics that would prevent the use of turnaround tactics in the future or adopt tactics that may increase the likelihood of a prompt search and rescue. This increased risk of harm must weigh in the public interest balance against disclosure.

Taken together, we find that there is a very strong public interest in withholding the information.

Overall, for the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that the very strong public interest in withholding the information outweighs the strong public interest in disclosure in relation to each of the two exemptions.