FT/EA/2024/0427 - [2025] UKFTT 01126 (GRC)

Having read all of the material, including the closed material, we are satisfied that the SOP sets out, in broad terms, information in relation to the circumstances in which turnaround tactics can be considered and the specific criteria which needs to be met before they are authorised for use by the Tactical Commander at the time. This also includes the circumstances, or tactical parameters, in which turnaround tactics must not be used (or once commenced must cease), the nature of those tactics and how they should be implemented at sea. We also accept that the related training PowerPoint was specifically developed to brief operational supervisors and officers deployed on Operation Sommen.

Having read all of the material, we also accept that the SOP contains detailed narrative in relation to operational priorities and outcomes, technical capabilities, and relevant considerations in assessing risks and threats which inform Border Force’s response to migrant vessels more widely irrespective of the specific tactic of push-back.

Furthermore, we accept the evidence of Daniel Tobias Whale that many of the above considerations are equally relevant during non-small boat related law enforcement maritime deployments in response to other offences including organised immigration and drug trafficking.

By confirming when and how the turnaround tactics can be used, the criteria that needs to be met, and the circumstances in which they cannot be used, we accept that the information contained in the SOP and the PowerPoint could be used by and to the benefit of organised crime groups and others responsible for facilitating migrant vessel crossings to evade the use of turnaround tactics in future (if adopted) in order to successfully cross the Channel. We further accept the evidence of Daniel Tobias Whale that disclosure of the information could benefit individuals and groups facilitating crossings who could use this information in order to evade or undermine any measures put in place to seek to deter and prevent migrant boats crossing the Channel, given that the information about Border Force resources and methods have a wider application beyond just turnaround tactics.

We also accept that the disclosure of the information has wider implications outside of the context of small boats and would compromise the ability of the Home Office to prevent and detect other forms of maritime crime also.

We further accept that the turnaround tactics were intended to have a deterrent effect, which would be likely to be reduced if facilitators of criminal offences have detailed information on the circumstances in which such tactics (or similar tactics) may or may not be used.

For the reasons outlined above, we therefore accept that there is a causative link between the release of the information and prejudice to the prevention of crime.

We have carefully considered the Appellant’s assertion that there is no possibility of the push-back tactic being used in the future. We are satisfied, based on the open and closed statement of Daniel Tobias Whale, that it cannot be ruled out that these tactics or something similar may be adopted in the future. In this context, we are particularly cognisant of the dynamic and evolving nature of the small boat threat, and the fact that tackling small boat crossings and wider maritime crime in the Channel remain live issues at present.

For the reasons outlined above, we also conclude that there is a real and significant risk of prejudice and that the harm relates to the interest protected by the exemption. We are therefore satisfied that the release of the requested information would or would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and so the exemption under section 31(1)(a) of FOIA is engaged.