Claim No: IP-2022-000066 - [2024] EWHC 1369 (IPEC)
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court

Claim No: IP-2022-000066 - [2024] EWHC 1369 (IPEC)

Fecha: 07-Jun-2024

Issue 15: Is KK jointly and severally liable with the Franchisee Defendants or any of them in respect of any liability for trade mark infringement established against any of them?

Issue 15: Is KK jointly and severally liable with the Franchisee Defendants or any of them in respect of any liability for trade mark infringement established against any of them?

Law

136.

The principles relating to joint tortfeasorship were set out in Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] A.C. 1229. The headnote provides the following summary:

“In order to be liable with a principal tortfeasor a defendant had to be proved to have combined with the principal tortfeasor to do, or to secure the doing of, acts which constituted the tort; that that required proof that the defendant had acted in a way which furthered the commission of the tort by the principal tortfeasor and that he had done so in pursuance of a common design to do, or to secure the doing of, the acts which constituted the tort; and that whether the matters relied on by a claimant had any significance to the commission of the tort would depend on the circumstances in each case.”

137.

After handing down this judgment in draft, the Defendants notified me that they considered that I had paid inadequate attention to the question of KK’s knowledge in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lifestyle Equities v Ahmed [2024] UKSC 17 when considering the matter of joint tortfeasorship, and so I have visited this afresh. It follows that I do so after analysing and answering all of the issues in this case, including the issue of knowledge and whether the claim for infringement against KK has made out, for which see Issues 17 – 20 below. The Supreme Court in Lifestyle Equities clarified that in order for persons to be held jointly liable with a tortfeasor for a tort, they must have knowledge of the essential facts which make the acts wrongful, whether or not the primary tort in question (such as trade mark infringement as it was in that case) is a strict liability offence and whether or not the accessory liability arises from procuring a tort or by a common design. As Lord Leggatt (giving the leading judgment and with whom the other members of the Court agreed) explained at [137]:

“137.

Although procuring a tort and assisting another to commit a tort pursuant to a common design are distinct bases for imposing accessory liability, they must operate consistently with each other and such that the law of accessory liability in tort is coherent. Considerations of principle, authority and analogy with principles of accessory liability in other areas of private law all support the conclusion that knowledge of the essential features of the tort is necessary to justify imposing joint liability on someone who has not actually committed the tort. This is so even where, as in the case of infringement of intellectual property rights, the tort does not itself require such knowledge.”