[2024] UKUT 440 (AAC)

Having looked at the letter sent by NR to JC we are satisfied that it is not sexual in nature and that there was no suggestion that it was indicative of adult entrapment.

We note that JC was keen to get round to NR’s house for sex and it was also clear that they were not in a proper relationship. Even if she was consenting, in his pastoral role and as a mentor, JC should have been saying slow down and not indicate that it was appropriate for NR to offer herself to him.

If JC had the higher morals that he suggests to us that he had, he would have stepped away at the point where he was aware that he was taking NR’s virginity. Regardless of the age he thought NR to be, JC was in a position of trust and even if NR’s mother did not mention her age (which we believe she did) JR should have been aware of their different roles.

It follows from the last paragraph that we do not accept that NR's mother did not say that she was 15, given that that was the whole point of her going round to talk to JC. Even if NR was saying that she was at the age of consent and 16, it was self-evident JC was aware that she was still at school because he visited it and hence in a position of trust. That would apply even if NR was over 16.

We regard the trip to Lourdes as being something of a red herring. On such a trip NR would have been ‘marked’ as her actual age and so JC would have known that she was a minor.

In relation to the youth event, we do not accept that is where NR first contacted JC because, if she was one of 200 present, it would have been a very confident step to take. We believe that after JC had visited School A, it was more likely that the first direct contact would have been in the small confirmation group of about 30. We are satisfied and find that NR was 15 when they met and that the opportunities for meeting were limited to the centre and school A.

We are satisfied that the confirmation group was the main opportunity because the first contact of her phoning him leads us to conclude that she knew him well enough to contact him by phone. This meant that she must have met him before and the phone conversation was after the retreat. We note that there was significant direct contact before the call but that there was no demand for sex at that point. There was clearly a friendship developing through calls which led to the meeting.

We also conclude that if they were both working with children, as JC suggests, there would have been some common ground between them and they would have developed a conversation about where they worked, whether they knew X or Y (for example) and would have talked about what they did. The fact that JC cannot remember any such conversations suggests that he is inaccurate in this suggestion.

As we have already said, it is clear to us that NR’s mother did visit JC when NR was 15 and he was in his 20s and this was her attempt to “warn him off”.

We asked ourselves several questions to assess the evidence and credibility of the conflicting accounts. Where else could he have met her if not at school or the centre? If they were both working, wouldn’t some other venue be more appropriate? JC’s lack of shock and surprise when NR’s mother spoke to him is telling. Why was he not shocked or surprised?

Again, JC said in his evidence that to be over 16 in the confirmation class was the exception and so the people in those groups would have been 14 or 15. We note that the confirmation groups comprised either adults or young people; that there was no mixed age group. On that basis we do not understand why JC could have assumed that NR was 18.

The criticism made by JC was about the allegations that had been made, but that's all they were, only allegations. We have not relied upon them for our decision and neither has the DBS in their “Minded to Bar” letter. Even if they are factually accurate, they are not proven in this hearing and so cannot form part of our decision.

We conclude that JC wilfully and knowingly closed his eyes to NR’s age and even if he did not, he failed to understand the issue of breach of trust.

It follows that we conclude there is no error of law or material mistake of fact by the DBS in relation to the matters relied upon to support the barring decision.