[2025] UKUT 051 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 051 (AAC)

Fecha: 28-Ago-2024

Analysis

Analysis

The Case Law

15.

I shall begin by considering the decision of Peter Lane J in R(TV Harrison). Although it is not the first in chronological order, it is useful to start with this case since it sets out the germane parts of several earlier decisions at first instance and also considers the decision of the Court of Appeal in Banner Homes. I have also set out the relevant parts of the decision at somewhat greater length than Judge Neville did at first instance. Peter Lane J said that

“24.

In Banner Homes Limited v St Albans City and District Council and Anor[2018] EWCA Civ 1187, Sharp LJ drew on judgments of the First-tier Tribunal regarding appeals against decisions of local authorities to include land in the statutory lists, in order to give the following overview:

"10.

... The effect of the listing is that, generally speaking, an owner intending to sell the asset must give notice to the local authority. A community interest group then has six weeks in which to ask to be treated as a potential bidder. If it does so, the sale cannot take place for six months. The theory is that this period, known as a moratorium, will allow the community group to come up with an alternative proposal; although at the end of moratorium, it is entirely up to the owner whether the sale goes through, to whom and for how much. There are arrangements for the local authority to pay compensation to an owner who loses money in consequence of the asset being listed.

11.

The Scheme therefore confers a right to bid (to a local community group as defined in the 2011 Act), but not a right to buy."

25.

At paragraph 8 of her judgment, Sharp LJ set out passages from the Ministerial Foreword to the non-statutory advice note for local authorities issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government on 4 October 2012:

"From local pubs and shops to village halls and community centres, the past decade has seen many communities lose local amenities and buildings that are of great importance to them. As a result they find themselves bereft of the assets that can help to contribute to the development of vibrant and active communities. However, on a more positive note, the past decade has also seen a significant rise in communities becoming more active and joining together to save and take over assets which are significant for them.

Part 5 Chapter 3 of the Localism Act, and the Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations, which together deliver the Community Right to Bid, aim to encourage more of this type of community-focused, locally-led action by providing an important tool to help communities looking to take over and run local assets. The scheme will give communities the opportunity to identify assets of community value and have them listed and, when they are put up for sale, more time to raise finance and prepare to bid for them.

This scheme requires an excellent understanding of the needs of the local community. As such local authorities will have a pivotal role in implementing the Community Right to Bid, working with local communities to decide on asset listing, ensuring asset owners understand the consequences of listing, enforcing the Moratorium period and in taking decisions as part of any appeals process."

26.

In the Court of Appeal, the Banner Homes case involved the interpretation of section 88(2)(a) of the 2011 Act. It is, however, important to observe what Sharp LJ had to say about the "future use point" in section 88(2)(b), since it is specifically with that issue that I am concerned:

"32.

Banner Homes also argued at the review hearing, and before the First-tier Tribunal that in view of the fact that the Field had now been fenced in, it was not realistic to think the Field could be used in the future to further the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community i.e. that regardless of its central argument on "actual use", the respondents could not satisfy the requirements of section 88(2)(b). In this connection, Banner Homes relied on a statutory declaration made on 3 September 2014 by its planning director, Mr Paul McCann which confirmed Banner Homes' intention not to dispose of the Field, to keep the fencing in place, to maintain the exclusion of the public from the Field apart from the public footpaths, and to promote the Field for development through the Council's Local Plan process. This point was called, below "the future use point."

33.

As to that, the First-tier Tribunal found as a fact that the requirements of section 88(2)(b) were satisfied, giving these reasons at para 38:

"Given the long history of peaceable, socially beneficial (if formally unauthorised) use of the Field, and of the previous views of the owners, I do not consider that it is at all fanciful to think that, in the next five years, there could be non-ancillary use of the land, along the lines that pertained up to September 2014. The timing of the decision to fence the footpaths – coming hard upon the listing under the 2011 Act – strikes me as material. Also of significance is the uncertain present planning position of the land, where a recent application for the grazing of horses has been refused. Whilst I note Banner Homes' current stated stance, it is not fanciful, given the history of the Field, to think that Banner Homes may well conclude that their relations with the local community will be best served by restoring the status quo or by entering into some form of licence arrangement with the Residents' Association or similar grouping."

34.

The Upper Tribunal rejected Banner Homes' argument that in referring to what was "not fanciful" rather than what was "realistic" for the purposes of section 88(1)(b) and 88(2)(b), the First-tier Tribunal had made an error of law. The Upper Tribunal also rejected the argument that the First-tier Tribunal's decision on "the future use point" was contrary to the evidence, holding that what is realistic for the future, is a matter of judgment for the local authority (or on appeal, for the First-tier Tribunal) and is not a matter of "veto for the landowner", concluding that: "The First-tier Tribunal made a finding that was open to it on the particular facts of this case, especially in view of the history of use, and for the reasons that it gave." See paras 34 to 39.

35.

The Upper Tribunal refused Banner Homes' application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on "the future use point", as did I on the papers, on 27 February 2017. The application for permission on this Ground has not been renewed."

27.

In approaching the issue of future use (section 88(1)(b)) as it did, the First-tier Tribunal in Banner Homes adopted a construction of what the words "realistic to think" mean, which was first articulated by Judge Warren who, as President of the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, decided the first appeals brought against decisions to include land and buildings in the list of assets of community value.

28.

In one such case, Patel v London Brough of Hackney and Anor (CR/2013/0005) Mr Patel had bought "a pub named the Chesham Arms which had been there since 1866". Mr Patel closed the pub as he "wants to turn it into flats" (paragraph 2).

29.

At paragraphs 8 to 11, Judge Warren held as follows:

"8.

In earlier submissions it had been suggested on behalf of Mr Patel that it was essential to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the Chesham would reopen as a pub.  At the hearing, Mr Turney resiled from that submission and in my judgement he was right to do so.  The question posed by Parliament is whether "it is realistic to think" that there could be such an outcome.  This should not be confused with the test which courts and tribunals use as the civil standard of proof; a test designed to produce one outcome.  The language of the statute is consistent with a number of realistic outcomes co-existing. 

9.

It is convenient to deal next with a submission on behalf of the appellant in his reply concerning the weight to be given to Mr Patel's intentions.  It is said that:-

"The intentions of the appellant are clear and should indeed be the determinative factor in this appeal."

10.

Whilst I have no doubt that it is reasonable to take into account Mr Patel's intentions as part of a general consideration of the circumstances, I cannot accept this assertion about the weight to be given to them.

11.

If correct, it would seem to follow that that an owner need only say "I have set my face like flint against any use of community value" and listing will be avoided.  This almost makes the scheme voluntary.  I think it more reasonable to take into account Mr Patel's intentions as part of the whole set of circumstances.  After all, they are the current owner's present intentions and the legislation requires an estimate of what will happen over the next five years" (original emphases).

30.

In Gullivers Bowls Club Ltd v Rother District Council and Anor (CR/2013/0009), Judge Warren heard an appeal by Gullivers Bowls Club Ltd, the owner of land used as a bowls club, which appealed against the inclusion of its land in the statutory list, following nomination by a Community Association. Judge Warren held:

"11.

Turning to the future condition in Section 88(1)(b) Mr Cameron [representing the Bowls Club] submits that the existing bowls club has no realistic prospect of continuing.  He points to the poor state of the buildings and the finances and relies on a report prepared by GVA.  This finds that Gullivers is not commercially viable.  Mr Cameron submitted that since listing lasts for five years, my starting point in considering whether the future condition was satisfied, should be whether the bowls club could continue in existence for that length of time.

12.

I do not accept that the statute requires me to foresee such long-term viability.  Indeed, it seems in the very nature of the legislation that it should encompass institutions with an uncertain future.  Nor, in my judgment, is commercial viability the test.  Community use need not be and often is not commercially profitable.

13.

On this issue, I accept the submissions made by Mr Flanagan. Gullivers may be limping along financially but it still keeps going and membership is relatively stable.  Of course it is possible that something could go drastically wrong with the buildings and Gullivers would not have the capital to repair them; but that has not happened yet and, in an institution that has lasted for 50 years, it would be wrong to rule out community spirit and philanthropy as resources which might then be drawn on.  In any event, should the site cease to be land of community value, Rother would have power to remove it from the list."

32.

In Worthy Developments Ltd v Forest of Dean District Council and Anor (CR/2014/0005), Judge Warren dismissed the appeal of a developer, which had bought a former pub known as the "Rising Sun" outside Chepstow, and wished to build two four-bedroomed houses on the site. A planning application to that effect had been refused but was likely to be appealed. The respondent accepted nomination by the "Save our Sun Committee" of the land and building comprising the pub. On the issue of section 88(1)(b), Judge Warren held:

"17.

In respect of the future condition, Worthy Developments Ltd asked me to have regard to their intention to develop the plot to provide two houses.  I take that into account although I balance it with the fact that they have not yet obtained the necessary planning permission.  I also take into account the remoteness of the public house which must compound the general malaise affecting public houses nationally. 

18.

The written submissions ask me to consider which was the more likely to happen, that planning permission should be obtained and houses be built, or that the building be revived as a pub?  In my judgment, however, to approach the issue in this way is to apply the wrong test. 

19.

I agree with the council.  The future is uncertain. Worthy Developments Ltd may or may not obtain their planning permission.  They may or may not sell the land.  The Save our Sun Committee may or may not see their plans reach fruition.  It remains still a realistic outcome that The Rising Sun might return to use either as a traditional pub or as a pub/shop/community centre as envisaged by the committee. 

20.

My conclusion in this respect is reinforced by the pledges of support and petitions gathered by our (sic) Save our Sun Committee.  It is true that they have not yet made an offer with a firm completion date but their proposals are not fanciful.  It is enough that return to use as a pub or some other venture furthering the social wellbeing or interests of the local community be realistic."

33.

In J Haley (Old Boot Inn) v West Berkshire District Council and Anor (CR/2015/0008), the proprietor of the Old Boot Inn appealed against the decision to include those premises in the statutory list. The First-tier Tribunal held as follows:

"17.

As has been pointed out in other cases, the requirement in section 88(1)(b) is that it is "realistic to think that there can continue to be" relevant use of the building. Whether something is realistic does not mean that it must be more likely than not to happen. A use may be "realistic", even though it is one of a number of possibilities.

18.

In paragraph 17 of his report, the planning inspector found that Mr Haley's:-

"financial accounts would be a significant consideration for any person or company looking to take on the public house as a business. No doubt, it could influence whether the new operator could raise finance. However, possible new operators will differ in their need to raise finance and the operating profit of a previous operator will not necessarily be the same as another operator. Therefore, estimating trading potential rather than the actual level of trade under existing control is highly relevant which is the approach taken by the DCL report and the RBCPL." [DCL is a Council-commissioned report and RBCPL is the Re-boot Community Pub Ltd]

19.

I agree with the inspector's conclusion on this issue. If the second respondent acquires the Old Boot Inn allowing a tenant to run the business as a commercial concern (from the tenant's perspective), that is clearly a different proposition from an outside purchaser of the Old Boot Inn, who might have to factor-in the cost of acquiring the property in formulating its view of the business's viability. Furthermore, as Mr Morgan's report makes clear, if a couple were to purchase the Old Boot Inn as both a family home and a place of business, they would make more intensive and cost-efficient use of the asset than Mr Haley appears to be doing. In short, Mr Haley's way of running the Old Boot Inn is far from being the only viable means of doing so.

20.

For the purposes of determining this appeal, it is unnecessary for me to prefer one "viability method" over another. Notwithstanding the points made by Mr Culverhouse, it has not been shown that Mr Morgan's method is so deficient that it cannot support a conclusion that it is realistic to think that relevant community use can continue. Indeed, the points made above regarding the consequences of the Old Boot being owned by, respectively the second respondent or by a couple making maximum use of the residential opportunities of the property do not require one to choose one particular profit-calculating method over another.

21.

Finally, the planning decision is manifestly relevant to the section 88(1)(b) issue in that, since planning permission for change of use has been refused on appeal, it must, as matters stand, be realistic to think that Mr Haley will continue to run the Old Boot Inn as a pub, furthering local social wellbeing and interests; alternatively, that a buyer may emerge for the Old Boot Inn as a pub."