Permission to Appeal
Permission to Appeal
The Tribunal dismissed an application for permission to appeal on 14 December 2023.
The Appellant applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal on 11 January 2024. On 9 February 2024 Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs refused permission to appeal the papers and the Appellant applied for an oral reconsideration of the application.
On 22 February 2024 I directed an oral hearing of the renewed application for permission to appeal, which I heard by video on the morning of 12 June 2024. The Appellant was represented by its director, Mr Charlie Southall, who had also represented the company in the earlier proceedings. Although I had read Judge Jacobs’ refusal of permission, that was only by way of background and I had in effect put his decision to one side and considered the matter afresh in the light of the Appellant’s oral and written submissions.
Having read Mr Southall’s original grounds of appeal and his skeleton argument and having heard his oral submissions, I acceded to the Appellant’s application and granted it permission to appeal in relation to the first (misapplication of the “realistic to think” test) and second (inconsistency with legal principles) grounds of appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal erred in point of law for the reasons set out in the grounds of appeal. In particular if, as the Tribunal found, the prospects that the Montreal Arms would see any use in the next five years which would further the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community were “slim”, could it be said that it was still “realistic” to think that it could? In my judgment, the second ground of appeal was really a different formulation of the first ground, but was inseparably bound up with it.
I did not, however, grant permission to appeal in respect of the other grounds of appeal, which essentially sought to relitigate factual issues already determined by the Tribunal. I do not need to consider those grounds any further.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The First-tier Tribunal Decision
- Permission to Appeal
- The Statutory Framework
- The Grounds of Appeal
- The Council’s Submissions
- The Appellant’s Reply
- Analysis
- Section 9
- Section 10
- the test is not one of the civil standard of proof, which is designed to produce one outcome; the language of the statute is consistent with a number of realistic outcomes co-existing: Patel at [8], C
- it is important not to concentrate on the hard-headed commercial or financial analysis and a detailed business case is not required, but it is necessary to show a sensible and practical idea of what c
- the test is a low one, but there must be at least some indication that the aspirations are realistic: Carsberg at [20]
- The Decision under Appeal
- Conclusion Conclusions
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