[2025] UKUT 051 (AAC)

For these reasons I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not make an error of law in its decision. The grounds of appeal for which I gave permission do not point to errors of law by the Tribunal. Rather, they are in essence an attempt to re-argue the factual merits of the original appeal. The grounds of appeal really go to the weight to be attached to the evidence in the case, which is quintessentially a matter of fact for the Tribunal at first instance to determine.As the Court of Appeal has observed,it is not the Upper Tribunal’s role to “set the appeal tribunal to rights by teaching them how to do their job of weighing the evidence” (Fryer-Kelsey v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] EWCA Civ 511, reported as R(IB) 6/05, at [25]). The Tribunal at first instance is a specialist tribunal which weighs the evidence and comes to its findings of fact on that evidence. 

In summary, the Tribunal directed itself properly on the relevant law and gave concise, but sufficient, reasons to explain its decision. I remind myself that the weighing of evidence is a classic question of fact for the Tribunal at first instance. It is therefore an exercise in which the Upper Tribunal should be slow to interfere.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.