[2025] UKUT 329 (AAC)

Arguably, the essence of DBS’ barring reasoning was this. Between 2000 and 2004, the Appellant’s behaviour became increasingly threatening and violent (“a pattern of threatening and violent behaviour between 2000 and 2004, which escalated in severity and was repeated despite sanction”). The Appellant is therefore a person who, at times, is unable to control his temper and, if he loses his temper, might harm a child (“serious concerns that you pose an unacceptable risk of physical harm to child”). Arguably, DBS’ reasoning only works if (a) the Appellant’s current anger management capabilities are the same as they were in 2004; and (b) his deficient anger management is such that, if he loses his temper, he might harm a child.

Arguably, DBS made a mistake on a point of law by failing to give adequate reasons for finding that the Appellant continued to have the same propensity to violence which, on DBS’ findings, he demonstrated in 2000 to 2004, and which included a propensity to cause physical harm to a child. Arguably, adequate reasons called for some explanation as to why:

despite the absence of any proven violent acts since 2004, the Appellant continued to have a propensity to violence; and

despite the absence of any proven acts of violence against a child (the 2000 incident, whatever it involved, was not an act of violence and, since it involved a “youth”, may not even have been directed at a child).