[2025] UKUT 249 (AAC)

I am satisfied that the Secretary of State’s internal record of the 7 June 2007 decision manifests a determination to revise or supersede the Appellant’s Income Support award, rather than a mere provisional or preparatory step. Lord Millett's observations at paragraph 40 of R(Anufrijeva) provide support for treating such a determination as having immediate, albeit limited, legal consequences. Specifically, such a determination is sufficient to trigger the statutory obligation to notify the claimant in writing of the revised decision, which is an appealable decision, as required by section 12(6) of the 1998 Act and regulation 28 of the 1999 Regulations.

I adopt the analysis of Judge Fordham KC in LL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, echoing the constitutional principle that legal validity is contingent on notification of the decision. The absence of notification offends against the basic tenets of legality and access to justice, such that the decision is devoid of legal effect; it will become legally effective only upon lawful notification, as confirmed in SD v Newcastle City Council [2010] UKUT 306 (AAC).

The relevant legislation does not define "decision" for the purposes of section 12(1) or (2) of the Act. However, the Upper Tribunal in BM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DLA) [2022] UKUT 101 (AAC) made clear that the statutory structure is designed to safeguard against arbitrary removal of awards, ensuring finality save for alteration by the prescribed statutory mechanisms of appeal, revision, or supersession.

Effective notification is thus an absolute requirement before any revised or superseded decision assumes the status of a decision invoking a right of appeal under section 12(1). While the Respondent’s internal record may suffice to trigger a notification obligation, where that obligation is not fulfilled, the intended alteration to the finality of the original entitlement decision simply fails. The original decision remains in full force and is the sole basis for any right of appeal.

I therefore conclude that unless and until notification of a revision or supersession of the Appellant’s entitlement to Income Support takes place in accordance with regulation 28, such a decision cannot be appealed under section 12(1). This result is consistent with preserving the finality of entitlement decisions under sections 8 and 10 read with section 17, as any contrary interpretation would subvert this important safeguard.

Accordingly, there was no final and notified decision to revise or supersede the Appellant’s entitlement to Income Support, and thus no jurisdiction for the Tribunal to entertain an appeal against it.