Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 249 (AAC)

Fecha: 18-Feb-2025

Issue 4: Application of Adesina and the Principles Governing Time-Limits

Issue 4: Application of Adesina and the Principles Governing Time-Limits

101.

I have determined that official errors occurred as a consequence of the Respondent’s failure to notify the Appellant of the decision to revise entitlement and the subsequent attempt to recover overpaid Income Support in the absence of such notification (as considered in LL). The Commissioners in R(IS) 15/04 provide authoritative guidance as to the treatment of established official errors arising from acts or omissions of the Respondent.

102.

However, the presence of official errors in the context of the recoverability decisions does not, on the proper application of the principles set out in Adesina, provide a basis for extending the time allowed for the Appellant to appeal those recoverability decisions which were notified in 2007. The relevant appeal periods commenced following notification of the recoverability decisions in June and September 2007. During that time the Appellant was indisputably aware of the overpayment allegations, sought advice from the Citizens Advice Bureau, but did not submit an appeal within the prescribed time.

103.

As established in LL, had the Appellant exercised her right to appeal within the statutory period, the tribunal would have been positioned to determine the relevant issues contemporaneously with the underlying events. I adopt and endorse the Upper Tribunal’s reasoning in PM and SM at paragraph 6, which sets out the rationale underpinning strict adherence to time-limits:

I acknowledge that time limits can appear harsh to Appellants who fall foul of them. However, time limits are a normal feature of legal systems and arise because of wider considerations of justice. Where decisions are made by public bodies, it is recognised that the public interest in good administration requires that public authorities, third parties and others are not kept in suspense as to the legal validity of decisions for longer than necessary (King v East Ayrshire Council 1998 SC 182 p 196). In social security appeals, the focus is on circumstances as they existed at the time of the SSWP’s decision under appeal (section 12(8)(b) of the 1998 Act). Given the difficulty of looking back in time to determine cases once a considerable time has elapsed, and consequent adverse effects on justice, time limits operate to prevent stale cases proceeding. Time limits also operate to safeguard a system in which vulnerable claimants of subsistence benefits can apply to tribunals for decisions close in time to the original decision.

There are three mitigating factors for benefit claimants adversely affected by time limits. First, new claims for the benefits in the appeals before me, disability living allowance (DLA) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), may be made at any time. This may not completely redress the effects of adverse time-barred decisions, because backdating of claims is limited (in general, no backdating of DLA to a date prior to a claim is permissible under section 76(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and backdating of JSA claims is restricted to three months: Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987, regulation 19(1) and (4)). Nevertheless, rights to these benefits are not lost for all time if an appeal against one particular decision is time-barred.

Second, there is a very limited ability in the tribunal to extend at least time limits under the Tribunal Rules in truly exceptional circumstances under the Adesina principle. Third, there is a residual right in any litigant to apply for judicial review. The Court of Session in Scotland possesses a supervisory jurisdiction and, in cases where there are exceptional circumstances, may exercise this jurisdiction, even where there was a potential alternative remedy (the statutory appeal) which has now been lost due to the lapse of time.

104.

In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the facts of the Appellant’s case justify an extension or departure from the statutory one-month time-limit (extendable by a maximum of twelve months) for lodging an appeal against the recoverability decisions. The Appellant’s failure to act within that period, notwithstanding awareness of the relevant allegations and seeking advice, cannot be remedied by reference to official error alone. The statutory scheme and the authorities require adherence to procedural finality and cannot support the extension of time sought in this instance.