The significance of the appellant’s conviction to DBS’s decision and this appeal
The significance of the appellant’s conviction to DBS’s decision and this appeal
Before we set out our findings of fact and deal with the grounds of appeal in this case, we need to say something about the significance of the appellant having been convicted subsequent to DBS’s decision.
As noted above when setting out the legal framework, DBS’s decision to bar the appellant was made under paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to the SVGA 2006, but the fact of the appellant’s conviction for possession of indecent images means that, if his case were considered now by DBS, it would need to be considered under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3, the so-called “auto-barring with representations” provision.
We considered at the start of the hearing what implications this has for this appeal. After discussion with parties, we indicated that it appeared to us that it made no difference of principle for the following reasons. The parties agreed.
Our task is to decide whether any of the grounds of appeal succeed by reference to the circumstances as they were at the time of DBS’s decision, at which point the appellant had not been convicted (and nor did he otherwise fall within paragraph 2 at that point). Counsel for DBS confirmed that DBS was not intending to review its decision to make a fresh decision under paragraph 2.
We noted that although paragraph 2 is referred to as an “auto-barring” provision, in fact where representations have been made, DBS has in principle exactly the same discretion under paragraph 2 as it does under paragraph 3 to determine whether it is appropriate to include someone on the barred list. Further, in principle, the conviction changes little that is relevant to DBS’s statutory task of protecting vulnerable adults and children: the same conduct has occurred and the same risk arises whether someone has been convicted for it or not. However, we acknowledge that there may be some different considerations. In this case, for example, the appellant has with his conviction been made the subject of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. If DBS were taking its decision now, it would need to take into account the terms and effect of that order and consider whether it was necessary also to bar the appellant in order to achieve the statutory safeguarding purposes. The fact of the conviction may also make a difference to what would be expected of DBS in terms of the need to ensure public confidence in the scheme.
This appeal, however, lies against DBS’s decision of 21 March 2023 and must be determined by us by reference to the circumstances as they were at that date, and without taking into account the conviction itself.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is that there are no mistakes of fact or law in the decision of the Disclosure and Barring Service. The decision of the Disclosure and Barring Service confirmed. The
- Introduction
- This hearing / reasonable adjustments
- DBS’s decision
- The grant of permission to appeal
- Developments since DBS’s decision in this case
- The relevant legal principles
- The Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction on appeal
- The significance of the appellant’s conviction to DBS’s decision and this appeal
- The evidence and our findings of fact
- The grounds of appeal
- DBS’s finding that the appellant attempted to pay for indecent images of children, rather than that he attempted to pay for images of persons aged 18 and over
- DBS’s finding that the appellant viewed the indecent image (video) of a child a second time rather than just that he accessed the dark web a second time
- DBS’s finding that the appellant must have realised the female in the video was a child at the time that he masturbated, and not just subsequently as he said
- DBS’s finding that the appellant went to great lengths to access the dark web, when in fact it was straightforward (and not illegal) to do so
- DBS’s failure to address the substance of the references that the appellant had provided, and to take those into account when considering what risk he poses to children
- DBS’s failure to take into account the appellant’s ASD diagnosis, and his difficulty identifying body language and facial emotion when considering the relevance of his statement that ‘it was weird bec
- Proportionality
- Roger Graham
- We bear in mind that we should not order a restriction on publication simply because both parties seek it: see X v Z Ltd [1998] ICR 43, CA. However, in this case, we are satisfied that the private int
- Open justice means that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited v Dring [2019] UKSC 38 , [2020] AC 629 the Supreme Court explained the purpose
- Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that: “Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the inter
- Numerous cases have emphasised the link between open justice and the right under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights to freedom of expression and have provided guidance on the nature
- An order anonymising someone who would otherwise be named in court proceedings is an interference with the principle of open justice. As Lord Reed JSC described in A v BBC [2015] AC 588 at [23]: “It i
- Ordinarily, it is said that it is not unreasonable to regard a person who brings proceedings as having accepted the normal incidences of their public nature, including the potential embarrassment and
- In this particular jurisdiction, the considerations are somewhat different to those in the authorities we have mentioned, because this is an appeal in relation to the appellant’s inclusion on the barr
- Conclusions
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