by the third party
and that does not fall within Art 8ZA(2)(c). 34. Of course, if the third party is an authorised agent of the individual, for example his legal representatives, then provision by them of the applicant’s postal address can properly be said to be a postal address provided for correspondence “by the person”. A sponsor institution of a student cannot, without more, properly be said to be acting as the agent of the student if it supplies to the Secretary of State the individual’s address held by the sponsor for its purposes. 35. Mrs Gray sought to argue that the phrase encompassed the provision to the respondent of the individual’s address by any third party (subject to data protection concerns), but in particular by a Tier 4 sponsor by reference to the report in Parliament of the legislative history of the amendment to the 2000 Order introducing Arts 8ZA and 8ZB. She referred me to a passage in the statement made by the minister for immigration (Mark Harper) in a committee debate on the amendment to the Order on 3 July 2013 (at tab 5, page 3-9) in the following terms: “If the migrant enters the country having been issued with their visa overseas, it is likely that we will not have a UK postal address for the migrant on record. We can seek to serve the notice via the migrant’s representative, if they have one. If that is not possible, or if it fails, we try to serve the notice via the migrant’s sponsor. In both cases, however, it is very hard to prove service of the notice on the individual. We now ask sponsors to provide the migrant’s contact details with the notification, or we write to the sponsor if no details have been provided. That has improved our ability to serve such notices, but the provision of an address does not guarantee service, as the address could be false, defective or no longer in use by the migrant.” 36. Mrs Gray submitted that it was specifically contemplated, therefore, that the Order would by amendment encompass the Secretary of State seeking a migrant’s contact details from a sponsor. 37. Mrs Gray further placed reliance upon the Secretary of State’s guidance to sponsors under the Tier 2, 4 and 5 Points-Based System (at page 9) that a sponsor must keep a record of: “a history of the migrant’s contact details (United Kingdom residential address, telephone number, mobile telephone number). This must be updated regularly.” That obligation, Mrs Gray relied upon, to support her contention that Art 8ZA(2)(c) should not be construed as if the words “to the Secretary of State” were added to the words of the provision, namely that the notice was sent to a postal address “provided for correspondence by the person”. 38. As I have already indicated, the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in Art 8ZA(2)(c) seem to me to require that the postal address (or an e-mail address under Art 8ZA(2)(d)) be provided by the person to the Secretary of State, rather than through a third party unless that third party is the individual’s authorised agent. Nothing in the minister’s speech or, indeed in the guidance, mandates that Art 8ZA(2)(c) must be construed so as to cover the situation where, as in this case, the individual has not personally provided their correspondence address to the Secretary of State but, instead, that address has been provided by the sponsor institution. There is undoubtedly good reason why a sponsor should retain contact details of those persons studying at its institution and, to the extent requested, provide those details to the Secretary of State. As the minister made clear, where an individual has entered the UK on a visa it is unlikely that they have provided a UK postal address. If they have failed to subsequently remedy that omission, it makes perfectly practical sense that the Secretary of State should be able to obtain that address from the institution at which they have been studying. That does not mean, however, that notice given to that address falls within Art 8ZA(2)(c). 39. In fact, in such a situation contemplated by the minister notice sent to that address would fall within Art 8ZA(3)(a)(i). In the absence of any postal or e-mail address given for correspondence by the individual, the notice may be sent by post to the “last-known or usual place of abode”. The address provided by the sponsor is very likely to amount to the “last-known or usual place of abode” of the individual. 40. In truth, the provisions in Arts 8ZA(2), (3) and (4) provide a panoply of mechanisms for giving notice by the Secretary of State. There is, in my judgment, no need to distort the ordinary and natural meaning of Art 8ZA(2)(c) to include a situation where a third party (apart from an agent) has provided the individual’s address to the Secretary of State. 41. First, the Secretary of State can send a notice by post (1) to the address for correspondence provided by the person; or (2) the address of the person’s representative. It is clear to me that “the person’s representative” in Art 8ZA(2)(c) (and (d)) refers to his representatives in immigration matters. Art 1(2) of the 2000 Order defines “representative” as a person who: “appears to the decision-maker – (a) to be the representative of the person referred to in Article 8ZA(1); and (b) not to be prohibited from acting as a representative by section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999”. 42. Leaving aside the partial circularity of the definition, the person must be “representing” the individual and the cross-reference to the 1999 Act’s prohibition on those who may provide “immigration advice or services” clearly contemplates legal representatives who provide such advice or representation in litigation and are “representing” the individual. It cannot encompass an educational institution which does no more than provide educational services to an individual. 43. Secondly, notice can be given electronically by being sent to the e-mail address provided for correspondence: (1) by the person themselves; or (2) by the person’s representatives (Art 8ZA(2)(c) and (d)). 44. Thirdly, where no postal or e-mail address for correspondence has been provided by the person or his representatives, the notice may be sent by post to, for example, the last-known or usual place of abode of the individual, their place of study or their place of business or may be sent electronically to the last-known e-mail address of the person or their representative (see Art 8ZA(3)). 45. Finally, if none of those methods are possible, the notice may be served “to file” in accordance with Art 8ZA(4). 46. In a case such as the present where the applicant has not provided a UK postal address, and it was not suggested by either representative that the applicant’s address in Pakistan included on his visa application was a “correspondence address”, the Secretary of State may send the notice electronically by e-mail to an address provided by the individual (as occurred in Mahmood ) or, in its absence as in this case, to the individual’s postal address provided by the sponsor on the basis that that amounts to his “last-known or usual place of abode”. 47. Mrs Gray raised the difficulty that may be faced by the Secretary of State if the facts were other than in the present case because the applicant had, subsequent to arrival in the UK perhaps following a further but earlier application for leave provided a correspondence address and, on inquiry from the sponsor, a different address was provided by the sponsor. On the face of it, the correspondence address “provided by the person” would not appear to be the most up-to-date address. But, on the proper interpretation of Art 8ZA(2)(c) the apparently more up-to-date address is not one to which the notice can properly be sent. Likewise, Art 8ZA(3)(a)(i) could not apply because, although the new address was likely to be the “last-known or usual place of abode” of the individual, that provision could not apply as it was not a case where “no postal … address for correspondence” had been provided by the applicant. 48. Clearly, in the circumstances as I have baldly stated them, the Secretary of State would be in some difficulty in the sense that the only address to which a notice could be properly sent would be the earlier (and apparently out of date) address provided by the applicant. To send it to that address might well not seem sensible if the underlying purpose is to provide effective notice to an individual of the adverse immigration decision. 49. However, the practical solutions in general are clear. First, the applicant may well have provided an e-mail address (as occurred in Mahmood ) as a correspondence address. In those circumstances, sending the notice electronically to that address will fall within Art 8ZA(2)(d) as a proper method of sending notice. Secondly, in any event, whilst there appears to be no obligation upon an individual subject to immigration control to notify the Secretary of State of a change of postal or, indeed e-mail address as I pointed out in Mahmood at [65]: “nevertheless any sensible individual who wishes to deal with the Home Office bona fide would inform the Home Office of any change.” The fact that the notice would have to be directed to an apparently out of date address is a direct function of the applicant’s failure to keep up-to-date, albeit voluntarily, his correspondence addresses whether postal or electronic. 50. It remains a matter of some surprise to me, as I was told in Mahmood (but on which Mrs Gray had no instructions in this case), that there is no obligation upon an individual subject to immigration control to notify the Home Office of a change of address, whether postal or electronic. Given the very many obligations imposed on those subject to immigration control and sponsors, this obvious “gap” in the system could relatively easily be plugged without, it seems to me, imposing an unreasonable burden on an individual. This is a matter which might well benefit from further consideration by the Secretary of State.