Wednesbury
principles, or to treat the issue of whether notice had been “given” as a question of ‘precedent fact’. In her skeleton argument, Mrs Gray submitted (at para 23) that the issue did not arise for resolution in this case but, if it did, Wednesbury principles should apply. I referred to this issue in Mahmood at [70]-[71] leaving the point open. It is not necessary for me to reach a decision in this case. Whichever approach applies, the applicant has failed to make good his claim that lawful notice was not given of the curtailment of his leave in the letter of 21 November 2013 to take effect on 20 January 2014. That proper notice was “given” is, in my judgment, established on the evidence. 57. It follows, therefore, that the respondent’s decision to refuse the applicant leave to remain on 30 July 2014 was not a decision against which the applicant has an in-country right of appeal under s.82(2)(d) of the NIA Act 2002 as he did not make an in-time application on 4 June 2014. The claim, therefore, fails.