This Claim
51. Applying the above analysis to the applicant’s circumstances, his claim cannot succeed. 52. First, it was not disputed by Mr Syed-Ali that the respondent sent by recorded delivery the curtailment notice to the address provided by the sponsor on 18 November 2013. Secondly, whilst that was not a “postal address provided for correspondence” by the applicant (Art 8ZA(2)(c)), it was properly to be taken as the “last-known or usual place of abode” of the applicant (Art 8ZA(3)(a)(i)). Thirdly, in the absence of the applicant providing a postal or e-mail address, notice of the curtailment decision was sent in accordance with Art 8ZA(3)(a)(i) for the purposes of s.4(1) of the 1971 Act. Fourthly by virtue of Art 8ZAB(1), as it was sent by recorded delivery, unless the contrary is proved, notice is deemed to have been “given” in the sense of being delivered on the second day after it was sent (Art 8ZB(1)(a)(i) and Mahmood ). 53. As I have said, Mr Syed-Ali did not dispute that the notice had been sent by recorded delivery. Indeed, it is not disputed that the letter was received at the address as it was not returned to the respondent undelivered. In his submissions, Mr Syed-Ali informed me that his instructions were that the applicant had prior to 21 November 2013 moved from that address and had informed both the Home Office and the sponsor. He accepted, however, that there was no evidence before me of that. 54. The basis of Mr Syed-Ali’s instructions is not consistent with the fact that the sponsor retained the applicant’s address on its files as his contact address at the time of its response to the Home Office on 18 November 2013. There is nothing in the Home Office’s documentation to support the Mr Syed-Ali’s instructions. The GCID record sheet (at page 31 of the bundle) contains no entry suggesting that the applicant, prior to 21 November 2013, informed the Home Office of a change of address. Mr Syed-Ali sought to place some weight on the CID record at page 29 which sets out a different address for the applicant in Buntingford. However, that is clearly a “snapshot” taken on 13 October 2015 of the then current details of the applicant. It casts no light upon what the record showed in November 2013 and, as I have said, nothing in the relevant entries supports any notification by the applicant of a new address prior to the Home Office sending the curtailment notice on 21 November 2013. 55. In my judgment, therefore, the Secretary of State has established that the notice was sent through the postal service by recorded delivery to the applicant’s last-known or usual place of abode. The presumption in Art 8ZB(1) applies that it was delivered two days later and was therefore “given” in accordance with s.4(1) of the 1971 Act. The applicant has failed to rebut the presumption that notice was “given”. Indeed, Mr Syed-Ali, in his submissions, expressly accepted that if the notice had been sent to a proper address under Art 8ZA then, applying Art 8ZB and its interpretation in Mahmood , it followed that notice had been properly given. 56. Neither party’s submissions addressed at length whether the proper approach in this case was to apply public law principles, in particular