Case No. UKUT-00448-(IAC)

, all of them if accepted or acceptable, capable of dispelling the suspicion that he had been involved in terrorism …. In particular, intelligible explanations were offered of the sums of money. ” [Emphasis added.] Next, in the context of a general reference to “ the literature found in the Appellant’s possession ”, Sedley LJ stated: “ About the latter I would say a cautionary word. It is one thing to have written, say, a foreword to a book; it is another to believe all that the book says or argues. Whether the latter is the case has to depend in some degree, perhaps a large one, on what the foreword says. Equally, most literate people own books with which they do not agree. Some caution is needed in attributing to anyone, in the absence of linking evidence, the contents of the books on his shelf. ” The passages we have reproduced above are (mere) observations, discursive dicta . This is abundantly clear from the preface contained in [66]. 17.The decision of the AIT was reversed and remittal ordered on the grounds that the AIT should have attributed no weight whatsoever to the Appellant’s convictions in absentia in Egypt and should have treated the evidence of the bare US indictment against the Appellant similarly: see [44] and [56]. This explains the following passage in the concurring judgment of Arden LJ, at [79]: “ The result of this Court’s decision is that at the remittal hearing the Respondent can at best succeed on some only of the grounds that it originally placed before the AIT. ” 18.The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, the outcome whereof appears in the following excerpt from the judgment of Baroness Hale, at [77]: “ …. [The Appellant] was challenging certain aspects of the guidance given [by the Court of Appeal] to the Tribunal which would hear the remitted case. In that he has succeeded to some extent. ” The Supreme Court concluded, following receipt of further written submissions, that remittal to the FtT , rather than the Upper Tribunal, was appropriate. 19.The specific question of law raised by the appeal to the Supreme Court was formulated by Lady Hale in [2]: “ … The question is whether all activities defined as terrorism by our domestic law are for that reason alone, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or whether such activities must constitute a threat to international peace and security or to the peaceful relations between nations. ” The Supreme Court enunciated three guiding principles: (i) First, Article 1F of the Refugee Convention is to be interpreted narrowly and applied restrictively. (ii) Second, Article 1F(c) applies to acts which, even if they are not covered by the definitions of crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in international instruments within the meaning of Article 1F(a), are nevertheless of a comparable egregiousness and character, such as sustained human rights violations and acts which have been clearly identified and accepted by the international community as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. (iii) In determining whether there are serious reasons for considering that the person concerned had individual responsibility for acts within the scope of Article 1F(c), there must be “ an individualised consideration of the facts of the case, which will include an assessment of the person’s involvement in the act concerned, his mental state and possible grounds for rejecting individual responsibility ”: see [15]. Lady Hale summarised the correct approach in [16], in these terms: “ In our view, this is the correct approach. The article should be interpreted restrictedly and applied with caution. There should be a high threshold ‘defined in terms of the gravity of the act in question, the manner in which the act is organised, its international impact and long-term objectives and the implications for international peace and security.’ And there should be serious reasons for considering that the person concerned bore individual responsibility for acts of that character. ” 20.The Supreme Court provided the following general guidance on the construction and application of the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention, at [75]: “We are, it is clear, attempting to discern the autonomous meaning of the words ‘serious reasons for considering’. We do so in the light of the UNHCR view, with which we agree, that the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention must be restrictively interpreted and cautiously applied. This leads us to draw the following conclusions: (1) ‘Serious reasons’ is stronger than ‘reasonable grounds.’ (2) The evidence from which those reasons are derived must be ‘clear and credible’ or ‘strong. (3) ‘Considering’ is stronger than ‘suspecting’. In our view it is also stronger than ‘believing.’ It requires the considered judgment of the decision-maker. (4) The decision-maker need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt or to the standard required in criminal law. (5) It is unnecessary to import our domestic standards of proof into the question. The circumstances of refugee claims, and the nature of the evidence available, are so variable. However, if the decision-maker is satisfied that it is more likely than not that the applicant has not committed the crimes in question or has not been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it is difficult to see how there could be serious reasons for considering that he had done so. The reality is that there are unlikely to be sufficiently serious reasons for considering the applicant to be guilty unless the decision-maker can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he is. But the task of the decision- maker is to apply the words of the Convention (and the Directive) in the particular case.” 21.The Supreme Court also examined the central tenets of the Secretary of State’s case against the Appellant. It noted the decision of the Common Serjeant, at [23], in the following pithy terms: “ The Common Serjeant concluded that the evidence was as consistent with the innocence of the accused (who had made no secret of his authorship of the templates which could easily be traced to him and had not destroyed any of the relevant documentation in his possession) as it was with his guilt. ” The Supreme Court approved the following passage in the UNHCR Guidelines: “[17] Article 1F(c) is only triggered in extreme circumstances by activity which attacks the very basis of the international community’s co-existence. Such activity must have an international dimension. Crimes capable of affecting international peace, security and peaceful relations between states, as well as serious and sustained violations of human rights would fall under this category. ” With regards to whether the test can be set aside where a person plots in one country to de-stabilise conditions in another, the Court added, at [40]: “ The test is whether the resulting acts have the requisite serious effect upon international peace, security and peaceful relations between states. ” The decision of the FtT under appeal to this Tribunal followed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court and ensuing remittal.