Control of development at Gap House and Claremont
Control of development at Gap House and Claremont
This is the familiar “thin end of the wedge” argument. For the objectors it was argued that if the Tribunal modified the restrictions to allow the dormer windows at Hillside to be retained it was likely there would be similar applications for modification from Claremont and Gap House. Mr Clarke said the objectors accepted that the owners of Claremont had very recently begun their compliant development, so would be unlikely to make an application in the near future, but at Gap House all possibilities remained, creating risk and uncertainty for the owners of Korobe and prospective purchasers.
We do not think that argument has any great force in a situation where there is no evidence of an appetite for development nearby (contrast the situation in Blue Angel Properties Limited v Jenner [2020] UKUT 360 (LC)). It is accepted that there is unlikely to be an application from Claremont; there is no evidence of any desire on the part of the owners of Gap House to extend or develop. Moreover the application is for modification, not discharge, of the restrictions; if granted it will permit only the extension of Hillside as it now stands and will not permit any future extension in breach of the restrictions, particularly in height. It is specific to this particular extension. Any future application from Gap House or Claremont would be decided on its own merits, and that is particularly significant in the context of a small group of three properties; this is not the case of a large area where single permitted change from single dwelling to flats is likely to precipitate more applications, as in Morris v Brookmans Park Roads Limited [2021] UKUT 125 (LC). An applicant would need to have an appetite for taking an application through to a contested Tribunal hearing, with the associated cost implications, and many owners would find that unattractive.
In our judgment, if the restrictions confer any benefit in preventing further applications, it is a small one and certainly not of substantial value or advantage.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The factual background
- Section 3
- The development at Hillside
- Development at Korobe
- Development at Claremont
- The present dispute
- The legal background
- Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to modify the restrictions?
- Ground (a): are the covenants obsolete?
- Ground (aa): practical benefits of substantial value or advantage
- The view from Korobe
- Privacy: prevention of overlooking
- The expert valuation evidence
- The sincerity of the objectors’ position
- Control of development at Gap House and Claremont
- Conclusions on ground (aa)
- Ground (c)
- Discretion
- Conclusions
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