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Ground (aa): practical benefits of substantial value or advantage
Ground (aa): practical benefits of substantial value or advantage
The Tribunal will have jurisdiction to modify the restrictions on ground (aa) if it finds that they are impeding some reasonable use of the land, and that in doing so they do not secure to the owners of Korobe any practical benefits of substantial value or advantage (the alternative public interest ground is not relied on), and that money will be an adequate compensation for any loss or damage they will suffer as a result of the modification.
As we said above, there is no dispute that the extension of Hillside is a reasonable use of the land. The issues therefore relate to practical benefits and to value. In the paragraphs that follow we consider
the arguments and evidence relating to the view from Korobe and
to the protection of Korobe’s privacy;
the expert evidence relating to loss in value;
an argument made by Mr Skelly about the sincerity of the objectors’ position;
the “thin end of the wedge” argument relating to potential development at the other burdened properties
and finally set out our conclusion on ground (aa).
- Heading
- Introduction
- The factual background
- Section 3
- The development at Hillside
- Development at Korobe
- Development at Claremont
- The present dispute
- The legal background
- Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to modify the restrictions?
- Ground (a): are the covenants obsolete?
- Ground (aa): practical benefits of substantial value or advantage
- The view from Korobe
- Privacy: prevention of overlooking
- The expert valuation evidence
- The sincerity of the objectors’ position
- Control of development at Gap House and Claremont
- Conclusions on ground (aa)
- Ground (c)
- Discretion
- Conclusions