[2025] UKUT 295 (LC)

The sincerity of the objectors’ position

Mr Skelly argued that the objectors have demonstrated by their actions that they are not concerned about their privacy. He referred us to Preston and Newsom 12^th Ed, 13-029 where it is said that an objector must always establish by evidence that their predilections are sincere and reasonable, and that in a case where objections were found to be frivolous or capricious – even if sincerely held – “the Tribunal would presumably say that the benefits alleged were not practical.” Two cases where the objectors were specifically found to be sincere are referred to, but none where a claimed benefit was rejected on the basis that the objectors’ position was not sincerely held.

Mr Skelly submitted that the objectors had purchased Korobe without any awareness of the restrictions, so could not say that they had purchased in the belief that the restrictions would remain unaltered. They had designed and built their glass-fronted house in the knowledge of Hillside in its present form, knowing about the restrictions (because the applicants had told them about them) but without troubling to enquire or take advice about their scope. Despite the terms of the Impact Assessment (paragraph 25 above) which anticipated that there would only be glimpsed and transient views of the new Korobe they had opened up a new access through which “all and sundry” can look into Korobe. They can now see and be seen from the ground floor windows at Hillside, which was previously not possible due to the wall and hedge. In all those circumstances, Mr Skelly submitted that the objectors have demonstrated that they are unconcerned about either privacy or visual amenity, and that privacy and visual amenity are not a benefit to them.

That argument has some force. It was made in closing, and not foreshadowed in Mr Skelly’s skeleton argument, so Mr Clarke did not have the opportunity to respond. We take the view that the fact that the objectors did not rely on the restrictions when they purchased is not fatal to their case. As to their later conduct, they have demonstrated that they are not particularly concerned about privacy, by opening up the new access; they have not suggested that the new access is temporary. We think that they are genuinely troubled by the view of Hillside from Korobe. We have found that neither benefit is of substantial value or advantage, and that is consistent with the objectors’ conduct. That conduct is not sufficient for us to find that there is no benefit at all, but it will have a bearing on our decision about whether to exercise our discretion in the applicants’ favour.