Assessing the aims of a measure and its justification
Assessing the aims of a measure and its justification
In SC at [165]-[185] Lord Reed laid down a number of principles for identifying the aims of legislation challenged under s.4 of the HRA 1998 while respecting the constitutional separation of functions between Parliament and the judiciary. In doing so he reflected Lord Nicholls’ speech in Wilson (No.2) at [61]-[67]). We give a brief summary of those principles:
Government is separate from Parliament, although there are many connections between the two. The legislative function belongs to Parliament, not the executive. It is Parliament’s intention that defines the policy and objects of an enactment. Accordingly, the reasons why Government promotes legislation cannot necessarily be treated as explaining why Parliament chose to enact it ([166]);
The will of Parliament is expressed solely through the legislation it enacts. Neither Parliament nor individual members give reasons for enacting legislation or for voting in a particular way [167]. Parliament does not operate solely, or even primarily, as a debating chamber. It is also a forum for gathering evidence and extra-cameral discussion, negotiation, and compromise. Voting may be influenced by party policy. Thus, the decisions taken by Parliament are not necessarily capable of being rationalised [168];
It follows that Parliamentary methods of resolving disputes are very different from judicial methods, aimed at the production of decisions by an independent and transparent process of reasoning. That reflects the different nature of its functions. The Parliamentary process arrives at decisions the legitimacy of which is accepted, not because of the quality or transparency of the reasoning involved, but because of the democratic credentials of its decision-makers [169];
Consequently, the courts must be careful not to undermine Parliament’s functions by requiring or encouraging conformity with a judicial model of rationality, which is not suited to resolving differences of political opinion [171]. The intention of Parliament is essentially a legal construct rather than something which can be discovered by an empirical investigation. This is illustrated by the way in which the court identified the rationale for the Hunting Act 2004 [172], referring to R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52; [2008] 1 AC 719 at [40] (and see [137]-[138] below);
When considering whether to make a DoI, the court has to identify the practical effect and the policy objective of the legislation for comparison with the Convention right. What is relevant is the underlying social purpose that the statutory provision seeks to achieve. That purpose is often self-evident, but where it is not, the court may need to look outside the statute to see the complete picture [173];
The court must decide whether the legislation satisfies a proportionality test: whether the means used by the legislation to achieve its policy is appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse effects. Sometimes the court may need additional background material on the nature and extent of a social problem at which the legislation is aimed, so as to throw light on its rationale. That material may include a White Paper, statements made during a debate on a Bill, or explanatory notes published with a bill. But a ministerial statement should not be treated as synonymous with the objective intention of Parliament [174]-[175];
The courts are to have due regard to the enactment as an expression of Parliament’s will; its proportionality is to be judged on that basis. Proportionality is not to be judged by the quality of the reasons advanced in the course of parliamentary debate, or the subjective thoughts of individual ministers or MPs. Members may have differing reasons for approving legislation, or differing views on its desirability or likely effect, which were not expressed during a debate. So, for example, a lack of a cogent justification for a measure from a minister does not count against its proportionality. The court is called upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister’s exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to Parliament. The court must not evaluate the sufficiency of the legislative process leading up to the enactment of the statute [176];
The degree of respect to be shown to the considered judgment of the democratic assembly will vary according to the circumstances. Relevant factors will include the subject-matter of the legislation, whether it is recent or dates from an age with different values, and whether “Parliament can be taken to have made its own judgment of the issues which are relevant to the court’s assessment”. If so the court will be more inclined to accept Parliament’s decision out of respect for democratic decision-making on matters of political controversy [178]-[180].
In order to decide whether legislation is compatible with Convention rights, the court usually needs to decide whether it strikes a reasonable balance between competing interests. If it can be inferred that Parliament formed a judgment that the legislation was appropriate, notwithstanding its potential impact upon interests protected by the ECHR, that may be relevant to the court’s assessment, because of the respect owed to the legislature’s view. If on the other hand there is no indication that Parliament considered that issue, that factor will be absent, but that will not count against the court upholding the compatibility of the measure. In that situation, the court will have to consider the issue, absent that factor, but paying appropriate respect to the will of Parliament as expressed in the legislation [182];
The court should go no further than to ascertain whether matters relevant to compatibility were raised during the legislative process, so as to avoid assessing the adequacy or cogency of Parliament’s consideration of them. A “high-level review” of whether a topic was raised before Parliament, whether in debate or otherwise should suffice. The court must not treat the absence or poverty of debate in Parliament as a reason supporting a finding of incompatibility [183]-[184].
The court may also take note of the efforts made by parties to campaign against legislation during its passage through Parliament, thus ensuring that their concerns were made known to Parliamentarians [179] and [185]. Referring to Lord Bingham in Countryside Alliance at [8], [40] and [45], this point applies also to consultation exercises and official reports leading up to the laying of the Bill before Parliament.
To that summary of principles we would add a reference to Wilson at [61]. When assessing the aims of a measure the court will look primarily at the legislation. On one level the objective of a measure is coincident with its effect. But a proportionality assessment is not so confined, it looks at the underlying social purpose sought to be achieved by the provision in question. It is for that reason that the court may need to look at broader background material.
The analysis in Countryside Alliance was to similar effect. There the court decided that the Hunting Act 2004 had a composite aim rather than a single aim. At [40], Lord Bingham noted that there had been “much argument” in the case as to the objects of the 2004 Act, which the Divisional Court had identified as being “a composite one of preventing or reducing unnecessary suffering to wild mammals, overlaid by a moral viewpoint that causing suffering to animals for sport is unethical and should, so far as practical and proportionate, be stopped”. That conclusion (which reflects the fact that, like human actions, legislative actions can have more than one object) was drawn from the terms of the legislation itself, an earlier Bill which Parliament had considered to be inadequate, and various reports and Parliamentary hearings. The House of Lords held that the Divisional Court had been entitled to reach that conclusion by reference to background material, notwithstanding that “this rationale was nowhere expressed in the Act, that this did not reflect the Government’s intention in introducing the Bill and that virtually no Parliamentary statement expressed the rationale in this way.”
There was a difference between the parties in the present case as to how dominant the terms of the legislation are in identifying the objects of that legislation. We accept that they represent a starting point in the enquiry, and, where they clearly identify the object, this will carry significant weight (hence Lord Nicholls’ statement in Wilson at [61] that the court will look “primarily” at the legislation). But we accept Ms Wakefield KC’s submission that it is not appropriate to equate the object of legislation with the effect of legislation. This was the point made by Lord Nicholls in Wilson, [61] when observing that “at one level” the object of legislation “will be coincident with its effect … but that is not the relevant level for Convention purposes” where what matters “is the underlying social purpose sought to be achieved.” As Ms Wakefield noted, the effect of legislation may reflect decisions as to how a particular, narrower object can most easily be achieved, rather than being an object in itself. Further, the identification of purpose for the purposes of the A1P1 enquiry is not, conceptually, the same exercise as the search for Parliament’s purpose or intention when undertaking the task of statutory interpretation. As Lord Sales observed in “Purpose in Law and Interpretation: the FA Mann Lecture”, Herbert Smith Freehills, 19 November 2024 at p.24:
“As in relation to the interpretation of a statute the identification of a legitimate aim also involves reference to Parliament’s purpose, but in this case assessed at a higher level of generality from a viewpoint external to the statute itself and the specific meaning to be given to it.”
That said, referring to a submission by Sir James Eadie, we would not expect to find that Parliament had an object which was “evidently much narrower than the terms and set up of the legislation” without a compelling case to this effect, based, for example, on non-statutory material and an explanation for any significant mismatch.
- Heading
- Lord Justice Holgate and Mr Justice Foxton This judgment is set out under the following headings
- The parties
- The issues raised by the parties
- The legislative history
- The LFRA 2024
- Article 1 of the First Protocol – the legal principles The approach of UK courts to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
- The structure of A1P1
- James v United Kingdom
- Strasbourg jurisprudence after James
- Are the effects of the wasting asset problem priced into the premia for residential leaseholds?
- Proportionality in domestic law – general principles
- Assessing the aims of a measure and its justification
- The width of the margin of appreciation
- General rules or bright lines
- Less intrusive measures
- The ab ante principle
- Indirect discrimination
- The requirement for compensation to be reasonably related to the value of the property taken
- The concept of market value
- The evolution of the measures under challenge
- The Law Commission embarks on a further leasehold reform project
- Contributions from Government and Parliament
- The Law Commission Consultation Paper No.238
- Further Government and Parliamentary activity
- The Law Commission Valuation Report (No.387)
- CMA involvement
- The Law Commission Enfranchisement Report (No.392)
- The Government moves towards legislation
- The Impact Assessment
- The Bill
- The ECHR Memorandum
- Engagement by the claimants in the reform process
- After the LFRA 2024 was enacted
- Estimates of the impact of the measures The material before the court
- The challenge to the IA and Addendum IA
- The aims of the measures The rival cases as to the objects of the LFRA 2024
- The legislation
- Hansard
- The statutory interventions prior to the LFRA 2024
- The material from 2016 to the enactment of the LFRA 2024
- Conclusions as to objects
- Are the measures rationally connected with the identified objects?
- The Ground Rent Cap
- The background
- Whether the objects which the Ground Rent Cap was intended to achieve could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure
- The “fair balance” assessment
- Conclusion
- The Marriage Value Reform
- Marriage value and the problem of the tenant’s lease as a wasting asset
- Consideration of marriage value in documents leading to the LFRA 2024
- Aims
- The claimants’ arguments on the justification for the Marriage Value Reform
- Whether the objects which the Marriage Value Reform was intended to achieve could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure
- The “fair balance” assessment
- The submissions of John Lyon’s Charity on the Marriage Value Reform
- Conclusion
- The Costs Recovery Reform
- Aims and justification
- Fair balance assessment
- Conclusion
- The cumulative effect of the measures
- Whether the non-exclusion of charities from the measures violates A1P1? Introduction
- Consideration of the effect of enfranchisement reform on charities prior to the enactment of the LFRA 2024
- The effect on landlords with charitable status
- The case for the Portal Trust Introduction
- The pre-legislative and legislative process
- The objects of the LFRA 2024
- Conclusions
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