[2025] EWHC 2751 (Admin)
Administrative Court

[2025] EWHC 2751 (Admin)

Fecha: 24-Oct-2025

The Law Commission Consultation Paper No.238

The Law Commission Consultation Paper No.238

202.

On 20 September 2018 the Law Commission published the Consultation Paper.

203.

First, the Consultation Paper points to issues inherent in leasehold as a model of property ownership. Thus at [1.2]:

“So we refer to ‘buying’ or ‘owning’ a house or flat. But when we buy on a leasehold basis, we are in fact buying a house or flat for a certain number of years (after which the assumption is that the property reverts to the landlord). A leasehold interest is therefore often referred to as a wasting asset: its value tends to reduce over time, as its length (‘the unexpired term’) reduces.”

204.

The Terms of Reference (“ToR”) refer to providing “a better deal for leaseholders as consumers”. “Our proposals for reform of enfranchisement are therefore intended to make the law work better for all leaseholders” (emphasis added, a word of potential significance given the prior breakdown of the leasehold market at [1.8] – see below). The Commission referred to the fact that in many countries flats are held by strata or condominium title and the concept of leasehold does not exist. Alongside their work on enfranchisement, the Law Commission was carrying out a separate project to consider legal issues with commonhold legislation which were affecting market confidence and the workability of the legislation, with a view to recommending reforms that would reinvigorate commonhold as an alternative to leasehold for both existing and new homes ([1.13]-[1.14]). The Consultation Paper contained an extended discussion of what some saw as “the inherent unfairness of leasehold tenure” and the wasting asset problem ([1.39] et seq), with references to “the diminishing value” of the leasehold interest, and the increasing cost of acquiring the freehold over time ([1.40] and [1.42]).

205.

Second, the Consultation Paper emphasised the width of the proposed review ([1.7]). The ToR referred to nine policy objectives for the reforms to be recommended by the Commission, two general, six for leasehold enfranchisement and one for commonhold. The general objectives included “to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector” and “to provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers”. Those and other objectives were broadly phrased: simplifying the legislation; and examining “the options to reduce the premium (price) payable by existing and future leaseholders to enfranchise” and making enfranchisement “easier, quicker and more cost effective”.

206.

Third, the Consultation Paper refers on a number of occasions to “leaseholders as consumers” (e.g. [1.53]), picking up language in the ToR in which one of the general “policy objectives” is “to provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers”. The language of the nine policy objectives does not refer to or focus upon the dwellings of resident occupiers. As to who the Law Commission had in mind at the initial consultation stage:

i)

Of the 4.2m leaseholders of both houses and flats, 2.2m were owner occupiers, 1.8m were privately owned and let in the private rented sector and 0.2m were owned by social landlords and let in the social rented sector [1.8];

ii)

The project was concerned not only with abusive practices but also long-standing concerns about leasehold and the Commission intended that its proposed reforms of enfranchisement would make the law work better for “all leaseholders” [1.23];

iii)

At [1.63(2)], the variety of leaseholders were noted: “ordinary home-owners (ranging from those with limited means through to very wealthy owners); non-resident owners (such as buy-to-let landlords, those with a second home; those who have invested in property) and some speculative investors and developers who purchase flats with a view to exercising enfranchisement rights and profiting from selling on the enhanced interest”;

iv)

At [1.64], the Law Commission said of one of the objects in the ToR that “Government’s desire to reform the enfranchisement regime to provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers is, of course, directed at individual home owners rather than investors”. This is supportive of the claimants’ submission that the word “consumer” is intended to focus on “ordinary home-owners” and perhaps “those with a second home”, rather than “buy-to-let landlords”, “those who have invested in property” or “speculative investors and developers”;

v)

There are other passages which focused on the last category in [1.63(2)]: investors who purchase with a view to realising profit from enfranchisement to consider whether they should be treated differently (e.g. [8.12]), noting that enfranchisement, and the Commission’s focus, was “primarily directed” at those using their property or properties residentially [8.13];

vi)

The Law Commission consulted on the possibility of cutting down the enfranchisement rights of commercial investors (i.e. on the right to enfranchise at all, rather than adjusting the terms of the price payable) at [3.20] and [8.185]-[8.193]. But having regard to potential “knock on” consequences on the property market and the wider economy, the difficulties of formulating a workable definition and preventing “work arounds”, the Commission thought it would be “extremely difficult” to exclude commercial investors from enfranchisement rights altogether [8.191]. It was also noted that commercial investors include pension funds and charitable trusts. However, although it was contemplated that the legislation might distinguish between occupational and some non-occupational investors, the suggestion that existing rights to enfranchise might be reduced did not gain any traction. We have seen no material to suggest that was merely because of difficulties in formulating workable provisions, as opposed to the absence of support for such a legislative object;

vii)

However, one suggestion for differentiating between different types of leaseholder which was discussed in the Consultation Paper proved more durable, and was a point of live contention at this hearing: whether there should be differential pricing for commercial investors seeking to enfranchise as against owner-occupier leaseholders.

207.

It is relevant to note how this issue first arose. The objects in the ToR (identified at [14.5]-[14.6]) included examining options for reducing the price for existing and current tenants; introducing a clear prescribed calculation methodology; simplifying the legislation and making enfranchisement easier, quicker and more cost effective. The first of these objects also required the Commission to ensure that sufficient compensation was paid to landlords to reflect their legitimate property interests. These specific objects were framed in the context of one of the general objects of the ToR, “to provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers”.

208.

Fourth, the Consultation Paper identified criticisms of the current law on valuation:

i)

The current law did not fairly balance the competing interests of landlords and tenants, both as to the valuation method and the effect of ground rents ([14.90]-[14.95]), noting that reforms relating to the terms of future leases would not benefit those “who already own a leasehold house.”

ii)

The complicated and expensive nature of the enfranchisement procedure, and its capacity to generate disputes ([14.96]-[14.98]).

iii)

Numerous other criticisms of the current law, simply taken as a valuation process on its own terms rather than its effect on tenants of a particular kind (see [14.99]-[14.106]).

209.

Fifth, in circumstances in which any reduction in premium would reduce the compensation received by landlords ([14.9]), that left the issue of “sufficient compensation” which was addressed in chapter 15.

i)

That required the Law Commission to consider the jurisprudence concerning A1P1 ([15.4]-[15.17]);

ii)

In the context of that discussion, the Law Commission raised the issue of differential pricing for different types of tenants ([15.30]-[15.36]);

iii)

Two points were made on differential pricing. The first was that differentiation might be a means of complying with A1P1, “depending on how the Government chooses to reform valuation” and what social policy object the Government was pursuing in the legislation ([15.33]), and the extent of any change to the law on valuation. The same point was made at [3.36(3)], where it was noted that “differentiating between leaseholders might be considered if the Government wishes to lower the premium payable by homeowners to a level that would not be justified for any other type of purchaser”, implicitly recognising that there might be justifications for lowering the premium to a lesser extent for all tenants;

iv)

The second and distinct point repeated the concerns expressed earlier as to the difficulties of differentiation between types of tenant, its implications for the object of simplification and how a two-tier compensation system could distort the market ([15.34]]-[15.35]);

v)

Against that background, the Consultation Paper proposed a number of possible approaches to valuation:

a)

The adoption of a simple prescribed formula for the calculation of the enfranchisement premium, which would move away from attempting to identify a market value:

i)

A ground rent multiplier, whereby the premium paid is a multiple of the ground rent; or

ii)

a percentage of the freehold value of the property;

referred to as “Option One”, which were regarded as more susceptible to an A1P1 challenge ([15.42], [15.52]);

b)

A variety of valuation options based on the existing methodology which would reduce the premium payable, including capping the level of ground rent used to calculate the premium (for example at 0.1% of freehold value); and prescribing capitalisation and deferment rates; and the removal of marriage value (Option 2A). In discussing the removal of marriage value, so as to leave the landlord with term value and reversion value, it was noted that “this is the minimum an investor bidding in the market would pay the landlord to purchase his or her interest”, and would reflect “what the landlord would receive if the lease ran its course” ([15.92]);

vi)

In order to make enfranchisement easier, quicker and more cost effective, the Commission envisaged that a simplified valuation method could be supported by an online calculator [15.104].

210.

Sixth, the Law Commission recognised that reductions in the price for enfranchisement would involve a financial loss to landlords, and that this involved “considerations of law, valuation and, ultimately, political judgment” ([1.59]-[1.60]). They acknowledged a potential range of objects for enfranchisement reform legislation, with the choice of those objects and the implications for the legislation pursued being political issues for Parliament. Given that, and the structure of the Consultation Paper as a whole, we do not consider that it would be appropriate to treat the Law Commission as “ruling in” or “ruling out” any particular object at that stage.

211.

Seventh, the Consultation Paper considered the issue of non-litigation costs in chapter 13. Noting that these were likely to be higher when the right to purchase arose by statute ([13.2]), the policy objective referenced in connection with this reform was to make enfranchisement “easier, quicker and more cost effective …. particularly for leaseholders”. Various criticisms of the current law were outlined ([13.35]-[13.39]). The matters identified in support of the proposed reform referred not to any particular type of leaseholder, but to the lack of justification for the landlord’s existing entitlement to be paid their costs, the pressure placed on all leaseholders by ownership of a wasting asset (referred to at [13.53(1)] as an “inherent weakness”), and the inequality of bargaining power which followed from this ([13.52(1)]). The Law Commission noted that the arguments in respect of non-litigation costs were finely balanced and asked for consultee views on potential reforms (including fixed costs and capped costs).

212.

As part of its consultation exercise, the Law Commission held various public events around England and Wales in order to explain its reform proposals and obtain views. The Law Commission also met with different groups of stakeholders to hear their views about reform and invited leaseholders to respond to a Leaseholder Survey on their experiences of exercising enfranchisement rights, with over 1,500 responding to the latter. Stakeholder events included a symposium at University College London on 5 November 2018. One of the claimants, Cadogan, also hosted a stakeholder event for the Law Commission on 5 December 2018. The consultation closed in January 2019 and received in excess of 1,100 responses.