AC-2024-LON-002099 - [2025] EWHC 1980 (Admin)

It seems to me that the starting-point is to focus carefully on what the Supreme Court held:

“78.

Because (save in rare cases) a court in this jurisdiction should not embark on predicting the likelihood of the outcome of the application in Poland, the bare possibility of early release on licence adds “little weight” in determining whether extradition is a disproportionate interference with article 8 ECHR rights.

80.

We envisage that a rare case is confined to cases where there is agreed or uncontested evidence sufficient to demonstrate an overwhelming probability: (a) that the requested person would be released under article 77 of the Polish Penal Code upon an application; (b) as to when that release would take place; (c) as to what the probation period and conditions attached to that release would be; and (d) that the inability of a court in this jurisdiction to provide for such a probationary period and to attach such conditions would not adversely affect the interests of the offender or of the public.”

One then applies these principles to what we know of the Romanian Criminal Code. It provides at Article 100(1):

“Conditional release may be ordered if:

a)

a convict served at least two thirds of the penalty, in case of a term of

imprisonment no longer 10 years, or at least three quarters of the penalty, but no more than 20 years in prison, in case of a term of imprisonment exceeding 10 years;

b)

a convict is serving sentence in an open or semi-open regime;

c)

a convict fulfilled completely all civil obligations established by the judgment of conviction, unless he/she proves to have been unable to do so;

d)

the court is convinced that the convicted person has reformed and is able to

reintegrate into society.”

It is here that the appellant’s submission fails. There is no agreed or uncontested evidence sufficient to demonstrate “an overwhelming probability” that the appellant would be released under early release provisions in Romania, nor when that release would take place, nor what probation period or conditions would be attached. It cannot be said that the inability of this court to attach such conditions or a probationary period would not “adversely affect” the interests of the public. Put another way, the appellant fails each limb of the Supreme Court’s “rare case” test.